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LINCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN SCANDAL:
A CASE STUDY OF STATE-CORPORATE CRIME
Ronald B. Coleman, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2002

This thesis elaborates on the nature and scale of state-corporate
crime in the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal. It provides an account of a
political history of the savings and loan industry, the effect of economic
deregulation, and the Garn-St. Germain deregulation legislation in the
1980s, which produced the criminogenic (conducive to crime) environment
in the savings and loan industry.
This case study supports the hypothesis that criminal behavior at
the organizational level results from a coincidence of pressure for goal
attainment, availability and perceived attractiveness of illegitimate
means, and an absence of effective social control. Therefore, the Lincoln
Savings & Loan Scandal represents an example of state-corporate crime

in which the pursuit of profit by a corporation along with the failure of
state agency to effectively monitor Lincoln Savings & Loan Association,
which resulted in a host of criminal activities. Thus, given an integrated
theoretical framework, an analysis of state-corporate crime can be
integrated through three major theoretical approaches to measure the
empirical

support for state-corporate

interpretation of organizational misconduct.
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INTRODUCTION
LINCOLN SAVINGS AND LOAN SCANDAL:
A CASE STUDY OF STATE-CORPORATE CRIME
On September 19, 1990, California Authorities arrested Charles H.
Keating Jr., owner and Chief Executive Officer of Lincoln Savings & Loan
Association (Lincoln Savings) and American Continental Corporation
(American Continental), after a California Grand Jury indicted him on
eighteen counts of criminal fraud (Farnham, 1990; Greenwald, 1990).
State

authorities

accused

American

Continental,

a

real

estate

development company, of defrauding 23,000 Lincoln Savings' members
out of $250 million in worthless junk bonds (Day; 1993, p. 392).

In

December 1991, federal authorities indicted Keating on forty-two counts
of securities fraud for aiding and abetting in the fraudulent sale of the
worthless junk bonds (Granelli and Bates, 1991; Furlong, 1991).
Because of these indictments, the American public became aware of
the full horror of the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal that devastated the
small working-class community of Irvine, California.

the�
.__ter__
_ o.

-- It cost

government seized Lincoln Savings, it was termed "the most costly d·
al in American history" (Thomas, 1991, p. 31).
. billion (Day, 1993; Coleman, 1994).
Subsequent inquiry indicated not only did American Continental
defraud Lincoln Savings' members and committed other fraudulent
activities, but also an interwoven pattern of regulatory failure and policies
on the part of several federal agencies and state agency played a
1
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significant role that created the conditions, which led to the scandal.
These federal agencies and state agency facilitated the regulatory failure
through their refusal to enforce federal and state laws and regulations at
Lincoln Savings.

According to the House Committee on Government

Operations, serious deficiencies exist in the way the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (the Bank Board) handled the fra·udulent activity at Lincoln
Savings (U.S. Congress House Committee on Government Operations;
1988, p. 8). The Bank Board treated Lincoln Savings too leniently to offer
any deterrence when violations occurred (U.S. Congress House Committee
on Government Operations; 1988, p. 16).

Therefore, the Bank Board

failed to enforce the laws and regulations that would have protected
Lincoln Savings' members and American taxpayers.
Furthermore,

congressional

records

documented

networks

of

influence between American Continental and members of Congress who
received campaign contributions from American Continental with
significant repercussions on the enforcement of Lincoln Savings (U.S.
Congress House Committee on Government Operations; 1988, p. 16). Five
United States Senators intervened on the regulatory process and delayed
the seizure of Lincoln Savings from American Continental. In addition,
the Bank Board moved the Lincoln Savings' oversight from San Francisco
to Washington, D.C., the Bank Board's headquarters, to avoid the seizure
of Lincoln Savings.
The Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal and the regulatory
environment that made it possible emphasize the importance of the
interaction between corporations and government in the production of
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criminal behavior by businesses. The technical cause of the scandal was
bank deregulation of the savings and loan industry's infrastructure in the
1980s.

As a result, American Continental used sophistry to beguile

Lincolns Savings' members out of their life savings. In addition, bank
deregulation allowed American Continental to make a host of fraudulent
investments with Lincoln Savings' federally insured funds at taxpayers'
expense. Therefore, those investors and taxpayers were the victims of a
. series of social decisions made by several institutions. These institutions
me u ed the Bank Board, the Federal Home Loan Bank in San Francisco
(FHLB-SF), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the
California Savings and Loan Commission. These organizational units
pursued a pattern of actions and relations that made it possible for
Lincoln Savings to remain in business and allowed American Continental
to continue its fraudulent misuse of federally insured funds in a lax
regulatory environment.
Kitty Calavita, Henry Pontell, and Robert Tillman have research
the broader savings and loan scandal (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman,
1990; 1991; 1992; 1997). However, this case study highlights the Lincoln
Savings & Loan Scandal, the key roles played by economic deregulation,
the Bank Board, federal regulators, and five U.S. Senators through a

--

variety of sources such as Congressional Hearings, media accounts,

\ oncius10ns
- --of previous
-analyses of white-collar crime that emphasize the
articles, journals, and textbooks.

In this respect, it confirms the

pressures associated with competition as important causal factors
(Sutherland, 1949; Faberman, 1975; Wheeler and Rothman, 1982). Thus,
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it will examine the ways in which the interaction between a government
agency (the Bank Board) and a private corporation (American
Continental) interests in the savings and loan industry culminated into
the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal.
Specifically, this case study will argue that the scandal represents a
special category of organizational misconduct" that Ronald Kramer and
Raymond Michalowski termed state-corporate crime.

State-corporate

crime is illegal or socially injurious actions that occur when one or more
institutions of political governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation
with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution
(Kramer and Michalowski; 1990, p. 3).
First, this case study will discuss the theory of organizational
misconduct as regards to state-corporate crime in which the scandal
occurred by examining the concept of state-corporate crime and other case

.

studies of state-corporate crimes. Second, it will examine the political
economic historical context of the savings and loan industry, and the
federal laws and regulations as it relates to the government's home
financing policy. Third, it will discuss the where deregulation went wrong
context of laissez-faire economic policy, and the Garn-St. Germain Act
that set the stage for failure.

Fourth, it will examine the scandal by

exploring the ways in which the activities of regulatory agencies
intersected with the activities of American Continental and Lincoln
Savings that produced the crime. Finally, this case study will examine a
theoretical interpretation explaining the crimes of American Continental
Corporation and the crimes of Lincoln Savings & Loan Association.

5

CHAPTER 1
THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL MISCONDUCT:
STATE-CORPORATE CRIME
The Genesis of White-Collar Crime

In 1939, Edwin H. Sutherland introduced White Collar Crime at his
presidential

address

to

the

American

Sociological

Association.

Sutherland's concern was crime in relation to business. "The economists
are well acquainted with business methods but not accustomed to consider
them from the point of view of crime; many sociologists are well
acquainted with cnme but not to consider it as expressed in business"
(Sutherland; 1940, p. 1).
Sutherland attempted to integrate these two bodies of knowledge as
comparison on "crime in the upper or white-collar class, composed of
respectable or at least respected business and profession," and crime in
the underclass, composed of persons of underclass socioeconomic status.
This comparison was "for the purpose of developing theories of criminal
behavior, not for the purpose of muckraking or of reforming anything
except criminology" (Sutherland; 1940, p. 1).
Ten years later, in White Collar Crime, Sutherland declared, "white
collar-crime may be defined approximately as a crime committed by a
person of respectability and high social status in the course of his
occupation" (Sutherland; 1949, p. 9). Sutherland used the term white
collar crime to illustrate that person of high social status commit crime,
which must be included in the study of criminal behavior (Sutherland,
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1949). Thus, the concept of white-collar crime has altered the focus of
crime as well as the usual traditional conception of the criminal as
underclass.
This contradiction in Sutherland's work led to the study of
corporate crime. The concept white-collar crime turned the attention from
conventional offenses of criminologist to the study of offenses, which not
had been included within the scope of criminology. Quinney suggested
that an expansion of the concept of white collar crime to include all
violations that occur in the course of occupational activity regardless of
the social status of the offender (Clinard and Quinney, 1973). Therefore,
it seems advisable to change concept from white-collar crime to
occupational crime.

Thus, Quinney defined occupational cnme as

violation of the legal codes in the course of activity in a legitimate
occupation (Clinard and Quinney; 1973, p. 158).
However, the concentrations on individualistic approach does not
work well when one attempt to explain the illegal behavior of an
organization such as a corporation. The corporations themselves as legal
entities, as well as some corporate officials who make specific decision, are
criminal.

However, once these systematic crimes become normal

operating procedure, they are not the responsibility of any one individual
in the corporation.

Rather, they are corporate crimes, in which the

corporation itself is criminal (Clinard and Quinney; 1973, p. 212.).
Therefore, in order to understand corporate illegal behavior, it is
necessary to create a macro level approach to study the social structure of
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organizations rather than individuals (Braithwaite, 1989; Kramer, 1982;
Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Vaughan, 1992).
According to Kramer and Michalowski, there is an important
insight and an important oversight within this approach. The insight is
. . . . 'I
that corporate crime is a form of organizational deviance (Kramer
and

Michalowski, 1990). Insofar, as corporations are formal organizations, the
study of corporate crime can and should incorporate the theoretical and
substantive insights of organizational research (Vaughan, 1983).

The

oversight is the failure to recognize that since the modern corporation
emerged as the basic unit of economic activity within private-production
systems in the late 19th century, corporations and governments have
functioned interdependent (Sklar, 1988).
In turn, the modern corporation in the United States could have not
developed, nor could it function without the legal, economic, and political
infrastructure provided by government (Sklar,

1988).

.....
Therefore,

governments in private-production systems depend upon corporations and
other economic organizations to supply necessary goods and services.
They provide the economic base for individual salaries and/or corporate
profits upon which governments must depend for their revenues and to
make possible the fulfillment of government development and policies
(Offe and Volker; 1982, p. 249).
Criminology has accepted the study of occupational and corporate
crime within criminology, but the relationship between corporations and
government agencies has remained on the peripheral to the study of
corporate crime (Tunnell, 1993).

Theory and research in the area of

8

corporate crime has concentrated on organizational deviance within
private business corporations. On the other hand, other scholars have
examined crimes and malfeasance by governments, what William
Chambliss terms state-organized crime (Chambliss; 1989, p. 183). These
state-organized crimes are crimes or socially injurious actions that result
as governmental organizations pursue goals that cannot be, or cannot be
attained easily within the circumscribed boundaries of government's laws
(Ermann and Lundman, 1992; Roebuck and Weber, 1978; Simon and
Eitzen, 1993).
The Development of the Concept of State-Corporate Crime

While the literature is replete with conflicting perspectives and
conclusions, a general framework for understanding white-collar crime is
beginning to emerge at the state-corporate level.

Traditionally,

criminologists viewed crimes of the state and crimes of corporations
distinct from organizational behavior. Thus, a separate body of research
and theorizing developed for each of these phenomena. The connection
between state and corporate goals, be they proximal or distal, some forms
of

organizational

deviance

result

from the

interaction

between

governmental agencies and private businesses (Kramer and Michalowski,
1990).

Therefore, Kramer and Michalowski introduced the concept of

state-corporate crime. They defined state-corporate crimes as follows:

State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions
that occur when one or more institutions of political
governance pursue a goal in direct cooperation with one or
more institutions of economic production and distribution
(Kramer and Michalowski; 1990, p. 3).
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This definition indicates that governments utilize businesses in
order to achieve government goals that intersect as to produce some form
of social injury.

Kramer used this concept of state-corporate crime to

examine The Space Shuttle Challenger Explosion (Kramer, 1992).
The Challenger's study emphasizes that the disaster was the
collective product of the interaction between two governmental agencies,
Congress, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
government agencies, and Morton Thiokol, Inc., the builder of the

..

Challenger's solid rocket boosters, a private business corporation. The fact
•

that NASA and Morton Thiokol had acted together to produce a serious
social harm suggested that government agencies and corporations could
act together to produce serious criminality (Kramer, 1992).
In another context, Kauzlarich and Kramer used the concept of
state-corporate crime to examine the environmental devastations caused
by U.S. Government and nuclear weapons manufactures in the production
of a nuclear arsenal (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1993).

Kauzlarich and

Kramer show how this institutional arrangement, guided by Cold War
cultural beliefs and structural forces, both propelled and sustained by the
desire for continued American capitalist expansion, resulted in massive
environmental injury (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1993).
On the other hand, Aulette and Michalowski used the concept of
state-corporate crime to examine Fire in Hamlet, the deadly fire at the
Imperial Food Products chicken processing plant in Hamlet, North
Carolina, (Aulette and Michalowski, 1993). On September 3, 1991, an
explosion and fire at the Imperial Food Products chicken processing plant
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killed 25 workers and injured 56 workers (Aulette and Michalowski; 1993,
p. 174). The technical cause of the fire was the rupture of a hydraulic line
near a deep fryer that resulted in a fireball that swept through the
chicken processing plant. However, it became clear that the company
routinely locked several of its fired doors, sealing off potential exits from
the flames and smoke.
Aulette and Michalowski's examination of Fire in Hamlet suggests
a different type of relationship between government agencies and private
business corporation. This relationship is where government omissions
permit corporations to pursue illegal and potentially harmful courses of
action, which facilitate the fulfillment of certain state policies. The deaths
and injuries were a product of a series of local, state, and federal crimes of
omission that facilitated the workers' death at the plant (Aulette and
Michalowski; 1993, p. 175).
The critical intersections were between a private business, Imperial
Foods Products plant and several government agencies. At the federal
level included the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, at the federal level. The state level
involved North Carolina-OSHA, the legislature and governor of the state
of North Carolina.

Finally, the local level was the county building

inspectors and the City of Hamlet Fire Department.
Each of these agencies, by omission, for a variety of reasons, failed
to perform the control functions assigned to them. They made it possible
for the continuation of hazardous conditions at the imperial plant that led
to death and injuries of many workers (Aulette and Michalowski; 1993, p.
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194).

Thus, Aulette and Michalowski revised the definition of state

corporate crime to include harmful actions that are not apparent directly
through active state involvement:
State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions
that result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between
(1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more
institutions of political governance; and (2) policies and/or
practices in pursuit of the goals of one or more institutions of
economic production and distribution (Aulette and
Michalowski; 1993, p. 175).
Matthews and Kauzlarich used this revised definition of state
corporate crime to examine The Crash of ValuJet Flight 592 that killed
the passengers and crewmembers (Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000). On
May 11, 1996, ValuJet Flight 592 crashed in the Florida Everglades and
killed 105 passengers and 5 crewmembers. The technical cause of the
crash was a fire that erupted after one or more oxygen generators
exploded in a cargo compartment. Governmental investigations indicated
that both ValuJet and SabreTech (an airline maintenance company) failed
to comply with a host of regulations concerning the presentation, storage,
and transportation of hazardous materials by air (Matthews and
Kauzlarich; 2000, p. 281).
In addition, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had an
instrumental role in the disaster (Matthew and Kauzlarich, 2000). The
FAA neglected its oversight of airlines, by not monitoring the general
safety of commercial aircrafts as well as its refusal to institute safeguards
and guidelines. These safeguards and guidelines would have protected
the passengers and crews from crashes on Flight 592 (Matthew and
Kauzlarich; 2000, p. 284).
-
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According to Kramer and Michalowski, state-corporate crime is a
distinct form of organizational deviance because it involves both vertical
and horizontal relationships between business and government, which
may have been viewed as separate discrete entities (Kramer and
Michalowski, 1991). For instance, the Fire in Hamlet, North Carolina, the
public might impute the deaths and injured on the Imperial Food
Products Company, rather than be concerned about how the state
facilitated the crime.
Likewise, in the Challenger explosion disaster, the public might
view the explosion as an accident, rather than consider how state and
corporate goals interacted to produce the death of six astronauts and a
schoolteacher (Kramer, 1992).

The Crash of ValuJet Flight 592, the

public would expect ValuJet and SabreTech personnel were responsible
for the deaths without recognizing the instrumental role the FAA played
in the disaster (Matthew and Kauzlarich; 2000, p. 284).

As a result,

Kramer and Michalowski have identified two forms of state-corporate
crime, state-initiated corporate crime and state-facilitated corporate crime
(Kramer and Michalowski; 1991, p. 6).
State-initiated corporate crime occurs when corporations employed

by the government, engage in organizational deviance at the direction of,
or with the tacit approval of the government (Kramer and Michalowski,
1991).

This includes the space shuttle Challenger explosion and the

environmental and human injury caused by nuclear weapons production.
In both cases, a government agency, NASA in the Challenger case and the
Department of Energy in the nuclear weapons case, actively pursued a
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shared goal with a private corporation, Morton Thiokol, Inc. and Rockwell
International (Kramer, 1992; Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998).
The day-to-day manufacture of various parts for the space shuttle
and nuclear weapons rests in the hands of private corporations. Both the
state and the contracted corporation must produce a commodity into
timely and efficient way to achieve mutually· held organizational goals.
The illegal corporate practices (manufacture of defective products and
environmental contamination) resulted from contractual relationships
that state agency either strongly encouraged or otherwise explicitly
supported (Kramer, 1992; Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998).
In the Challenger case, NASA pressured managers at Morton
Thiokol into granting permission to launch the shuttle; even though
scientists at Morton Thiokol, Inc. expressed great concern that the 0-rings
would fail (Kramer, 1992; Vaughan, 1996).

NASA, a state agency,

initiated the socially injurious event. It was through this interaction that

a private corporation and a public entity made a decision that ultimately
lead to the Challenger explosion. Thus, state-corporate crime is a form of
organizational misconduct that occurs at the interstices of corporations
and government (Kramer; 1992, p. 215).

These interstices are what

distinguish the crimes committed by corporations acting in the pursuit of
organizational goals from those crimes committed by corporations
pursumg shared goals with a governmental agency (Kramer; 1992, p.
215).
On the other hand, state-facilitated corporate crime occurs when
government regulatory institutions fail to restrain deviant business
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activities, either because of direct collusion between business and
"government, or because they adhere to share goals whose attainment
would be hampered by aggressive regulation" (Kramer and Michalowski;
1991, p. 6). The state might encourage organizational deviance or in some
other way act as a criminogenic force. For example, the examination of
Fire in Hamlet did not focus on the technical c·ause of injury, or Imperial
Food Product's decision to lock fire doors. Instead, it argues that the 25
workers who died were the victims of "a series of social decisions made by
a broad array of institutions" (Aulette and Michalowski; 1993, p. 172).
The Crash of ValuJet Flight 592 and deaths can be linked to the
FAA.

The FAA ignored two recommendations by the National

Transportation Safety Board to (1) place smoke detectors in cargo holds,
and (2) reclassify D cargo holds so that they would contain a fire and not
allow it to spread to the rest of the plane (Matthews and Kauzlarich;
2000, p. 284). Had the FAA followed these recommendations, flight 592
could have landed safely and more than a hundred lives would have been
saved.
Since state-facilitated corporate crime involves acts of om1ss10n
rather than commission, it is one of the least recognizable forms of state
involvement in crime (Kramer and Michalowski, 1991).

There are

varieties of identifiable and specific actions or inactions by governmental
agencies that might lead to identifiable social harms.

This case study

suggests a relationship in which government omissions permit a private
business to pursue illegal and potentially injurious courses of action,
which facilitate the fulfillment of certain state policies.
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This case study will highlight not only the broader structural
policies, which contributed to the scandal, but also the very specific items
overlooked or ignored by the Bank Board that can be directly linked to the
criminal fraud at Lincoln Savings.

..

The Bank Board ignored two

recommendations by the Federal Home Loan Bank regulators in San

...

Francisco to (1) place Lincoln Savings in conservatorship in attempt to
make Lincoln Savings lucrative, and (2) place Lincoln Savings in
receivership. The receivership would had close Lincoln Savings and pay
off stockholders (Pepinsky and Jesilow; 1992, p. 73).

Furthermore, the

Bank Board ignored several condemning reports by federal field
regulators and a private accounting firm about Lincoln Savings'
fraudulent investments with federally insured funds.
The Development of A Theory of State Corporate Crime
Kramer and Michalowski introduced an integrated theoretical
framework to analyze organizational offenses such as state-corporate
crimes (Kramer and Michalowski, 1990).

....
They noted there were three

major theoretical approaches to the study of corporate crime and each
corresponded to a different level of social action.

The first theoretical

perspective was differential association, which addressed the individual
level of action developed by Sutherland (Sutherland 1940, 1949).
The second theoretical perspective was organizational theory,
which argued that organizations could be criminogenic either due to the
performance emphasis on goals (Finney and Lesieur, 1982; Gross, 1978;
Kramer, 1982).

Organizational theory focused on specific institutional

factors promoting or retarding corporate crime (Kramer, Michalowski, and
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Kauzlarich; 2002, p. 272).
cnmmogemc

In addition, organizations could be

because of defective standard operating procedures

(Hopkins, 1978). This organizational approach merged with an anomie
perspective on corporate crime (Passas, 1990; Vaughan, 1982, 1983, 1996).
The third theoretical perspective located the criminogenic forces in
the wider political economic structure of capitalism (Barnett, 1981;
Michalowski, 1985; Quinney, 1977; Young, 1981). The political-economic
approach examined the way broad, preexisting societal characteristic
interact with the individual and organizational levels of action (Kramer,
Michalowski, and Kauzlarich; 2002, p. 272).
Kramer and Michalowski argued that all three approaches could be
brought together into an integrated theoretical framework although the
differential

association,

organizational,

and

political

economic

perspectives represented divergent approaches to explain corporate and
government crime (Kramer and Michalowski, 1990).

The structure,

dynamics, and cultural meaning associated with the political economic
arrangements of any particular society will shape the goals and means of
economic and political organizations, as well as the constraints they face
(Kramer, Michalowski, and Kauzlarich; 2002, p. 273).
On the one hand, the organizational level of analysis links the
internal structure of specific economic or political units with the external
political-economic environment.

On the other hand, the organizational

level of analysis links the way in which the work-related thoughts and
actions or the individuals who occupy positions in those units are
conditioned by requirements of the positions they hold and the procedures
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of the organization.

In addition, differential association directs us to

examine the symbolic reality derived from social interaction within
bounded organization niches by focusing on the social relations that give
meaning to individual experience (Kramer, Michalowski, and Kauzlarich;
2002, p. 273).

This examination of the literature indicates strong

parallels in the forces that promote state-corporate crime, on all three
approaches, which can serve as an important integrating principle.
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CHAPTER2
POLITICAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
THE SAVINGS & LOAN INDUSTRY
Historically, a set of political economic arrangements that centered
on the American policy to finance homes for American citizens in the 1800s,
the Great Depression, post-World War II, economic factors in the 1970s, and
bank deregulation in the 1980s, characterize the political economic history
context within which the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal occurred. The
overall climate in the S&L industry since the "Bank Holiday" (depositors
could not withdraw their funds) had been one in which federal laws and
policies toward both the growth and prosperity of the industry had failed.
The result has been a history of more government regulations, policies,
economic failure, and criminal fraud.
In the nineteenth century, part of the larger American policy effort
was to provide a central financing institution to finance homes for American
citizens (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 18). The government policy had allied
itself with the "American Dream" for an average citizen to own their homes
(Wilmsen; 1991, p. 36). Thus, the origins of the modern Savings & Loan
Associations in the United States come from the nation's first American
thrift institution called "Oxford Provident Building Association" (Wilmsen,
1991; Rom, 1996).
On January 3, 1831, a growing American middle-class embodied
the American Dream in Frankford (Philadelphia), Pennsylvania. Thirty
seven people organized Oxford Provident Building Association (Wilmsen,

..�

• :

..

.

19
1991; Rom, 1996). Oxford Provident did not intend to make a profit. Its
purpose was to obtain funds to build residential homes among the
proletariats in the textile trade who could not afford to borrow from the
aristocratic commercial banks.
Oxford Provident proclaimed that anyone could become a
shareholder by contributing an initiation fee ·(Robinson; 1990, p. 34).
Each member paid five-dollars a share and three-dollars each month
(Brumbaugh Jr.; 1988, p. 145). Whenever the association had $500 for a
loan, shareholders auctioned the funds to the highest bidder to build or
buy a home (Rom; 1996, p. 24). The association liquidated after the last
•
shareholder built a home.

Because of Oxford Provident Building

.. ... .

Association, building societies gradually spread from Philadelphia
throughout the United States over the next few decades
(Brumbaugh Jr.;
•
1988, p. 4).

• • I
In 1850, building societies incorporated and began
to take on the idea

of savings banks. Shareholders no longer felt a personal interest to take an
•

..

,
active role in the association's affairs, and professional managers
took over

the day-to-day operations. These institutions began
• making loans to people
who planned to build houses on their land as well as financing the
acquisition of existing homes. Therefore, the two ideas began the genesis of
the Building & Loan Societies.
As the United States entered the twentieth century, the Building &
Loan Societies became the Savings & Loan Associations (S&Ls). There

..

were 5,356 S&Ls with $571 million in assets (Brumbaugh Jr., 1988;
Robinson, 1990). In the 1920s, as income and wealth grew, there were

20
8,633 S&Ls with $2.5 billion in assets (Brumbaugh Jr.; Day, 1993). By
1925, the S&L industry reached its peak at 12,403 S&Ls with $5.5 billion
in assets (Robinson; 1990, p. 36).
In 1927, a movement began to initiate federal regulations for S&Ls.
Politicians attempted to pass legislation before Congress to create a central
•
reserve system to protect and stabilize the S&L industry (Marvell; 1969, p.
18).

However, on October 29, 1929, the stock market crashed before

Congress could take any action to assist the 11,777 S&Ls with $8.8 billion
in assets (Eichler; 1989, p. 7). As a result, the Great Depression occurred,
and the industry suffered large losses.

In 1930, 190 S&Ls failed, and

depositors lost $24.5 million (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 33). In 1931, 126
S&Ls failed, and depositors lost $22.3 million (Robinson; 1990, p. 36).
In December 1931, Republican President Herbert Hoover came under
pressure to relieve the banking industry's crisis. In his State of the Union
address, he recommended that Congress create a Federal Home Loan Bank
System to promote home ownership. President Hoover's recommendation
had two main goals for federal legislation:
(1) For the present emergency purpose of relieving the
financial strains upon sound savings and loan institutions,
savings banks, deposit banks, and farm loan banks that
have been giving credit through the medium of small
mortgage loans upon urban and farm properties used for
homes, thereby, relieving pressure upon home and farm
owners.
(2) For Congress to provide safeguards against the repetition of
such experiences in the future (Marvell; 1969, p. 21).
On July 22, 1932, Congress passed and President Hoover signed the
Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932, which established the Federal Home
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Loan Bank System (Calavita and Pontell; 1990, p. 311). The core elements
of the Federal Home Loan Bank System were the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board and the Federal Home Loan Banks. The Federal Home Loan Bank
I
Board was an independent agency of the executive branch of the federal

government located in Washington, D.C. Its governing body was the Bank
Board, composed of a five-member commission (later reduced to 3 members)
appointed by the President of the United States (Rom; 1996, p. 30). Thus,
the system was an imitation of the Federal Reserve System for commercial
banks.
Later that year, the Federal Home Bank System created twelve
districts of Federal Home Loan Banks throughout the country (Day; 1993,
p. 42). The Federal Home Loan Banks had two major responsibilities (1) to
lend money to member S&Ls within their geographical area, and (2) to
regulate S&Ls in accordance with the Bank Board regulations and laws. In
addition, the district banks sold stock to their member S&Ls. They used
the proceeds to issue bonds and used the receipts of these sales for short- or
long-term loans to member S&Ls (Rom; 1996, p. 71).
In 1932, the grim statistics continued for S&Ls failures.

One

hundred and twenty-two S&Ls failed, and depositors lost $52.8 million
(Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 33). Therefore, the United States League of
Local Building and Loan Associations (later named The United States
League of Savings Associations) [U.S. League], the nation's largest and
most powerful thrift trade association, lobbied for expanded federal
regulation and federal deposit insurance (Day; 1993, p. 42). Thus, an idea
of government insurance began to gain support from Congress to protect
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shareholders' funds and maintain the flow of funds for housing.
On April 14, 1932, Representative Henry Steagall of Alabama, a
Democrat who chaired the House Banking and Currency Committee,
sponsored a deposit insurance bill guaranteeing bank deposits up to
$2,500 (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 38). He feared that President Hoover
would make an issue of insuring bank deposits, and voters would reelect
him if Democrats did not act upon federal insurance deposits. Five days
later, the House Banking and Currency Committee recommended passage
of the bill (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 39).

The House's Democratic

leadership approved it, but Senate Banking Chairperson Senator Carter
Glass killed the bill in the Senate (Pilzer and Deitz, 1989; Rom, 1996).
Senator Glass, former Secretary of the Treasury under President
Woodrow Wilson, was an important enemy of regulation legislation in the
Senate. Senator Glass's conservative background and
political sentiments
•
were with the American Bankers Association (ABA). The ABA controlled
the big East Coast banks opposed to guaranteeing savings deposits. They
feared that deposit insurance would require big East Coast banks to pay
the bill for supporting weaker financial institutions in the South and
Midwest, where imprudent management practices were more common.
On March 4, 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt took the
oath of office as the nation's thirty-second president.

President

Roosevelt's greatest crisis was the collapse of the U.S. Banking system
and the S&L industry. From 1929 through 1932, 597 S&Ls failed with
$411 million in assets (Eichler; 1989, p. 9).

Therefore, President

Roosevelt declared a "Bank Holiday" from March 5 through March 9 to
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buy time for a solution (Robinson; 1990, p. 36).

However, many

Americans believed that federal deposit insurance was essential to reform
the banking system, and they wanted protection. Over one hundred
thousands Americans had at risk approximately $4 billion during the
"Bank Holiday" (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 36).
On May 10, 1933, Senator Glass arid Representative Steagall
introduced the Glass-Steagall's deposit insurance bill in the Senate and
House chambers. The difference between the two bills was the way each
treated deposit guarantees.

On the one hand, Representative Steagall

guaranteed the first $2,500 deposits by a fund financed by insurance
premiums paid by participating banks (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 48). On
the other hand, Senator Glass's proposal (more acceptable to big banking
interests) offered to continue government-financed funds restricted to banks
that were members of the Federal Reserve System.

This restriction

effectively prohibited deposit insurance for members of state-chartered
banks and S&Ls.

Furthermore, Senator Glass wanted to create a

"liquidating corporation," which would advance to depositors the estimated
funds they would receive when the firm liquidated (Rom; 1996, p. 272).
On June 12, 1933, President Roosevelt accepted the inevitable. He
acknowledged the strength of popular support behind the federal deposit
msurance. What emerged was a less than full-fledged insurance system:
(1) The Federal Reserve System would guarantee deposits of
up to $2,500 per member immediately in all banks that
were members of the Federal Reserve System, and to any
non-member certified state bank that federal banking
authorities as solvent.
(2) Participating banks would finance the insurance fund by
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assessmg a premium of 0.5 percent of their insured
deposits.
(3) Effective July 1, 1934, create a Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to administer funds to guaranteed deposits
(Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 52).
Furthermore,

President

Roosevelt

asked

Congress

for

more

legislation to help the S&L industry. Foreclosures increased by an average
of 25 percent each year between 1926 and 1932 from fewer than 70,000 to
almost 250,000 annually (Eichler, 1989; Rom, 1996). The industry's analyst
estimated that 40 percent of home mortgage loans were in default that
caused a 15 percent reduction in the size of the S&L industry (Robinson,
1990; Rom, 1996). Therefore, Congress enacted the Home Owner's Loan
Act of 1933 to relieve homeowners from foreclosure and bring new finance
to the housing market.
The Home Owner's Loan Act established the Home Owner's Loan
Corporation (HOLC). HOLC's major purpose was to buy delinquent home
mortgages from banks, S&Ls, and other mortgage lenders with the intent to
refinance those mortgages for fifteen-years at interest rates and required
monthly payments to pay off the loan (Rom; 1996, p. 31).
In addition, the Home Owner's Loan Act authorized the Bank Board to
grant federal charters to S&Ls, to regulate assets, liability holdings, and to
promote growth in the industry. The language appears in a paragraph of
the Home Owner's Loan Act:
The Act is to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which
people may invest their funds and provide for the financing of
homes. The Bank Board is authorized under such rules to
provide for the organization, incorporation, examination,
operation, and regulation of associations known as Federal
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Savings and Loan Associations, considered the best practices of
local mutual thrift and home-financing institutions in the
United States (Marvell; 1969, p. 112).
Federally chartered S&Ls had to have at least 400 members.
Members could not own more than 10 percent of the stock, and control
groups could not hold more than 25 percent in stock (Rom; 1996, p. 129).
The chartering structure for S&Ls was, thereby, made parallel to the dual
structure that applied to banks. S&Ls could choose to have either a state
charter or a federal charter. By the end of 1934, over 2,000 S&Ls became
federally chartered members of the Federal Home Loan Banks (White;
1991, p. 54).
In addition, the Bank Board issued three major regulations and the
methods of "borrowing short and lending long" that the Bank Board
considered the "best practices" for the S&L industry (White; 1991, p. 32).
The first major regulation was economic regulation that attempted to
control the economic power or market power of regulated entities. It had
four forms of federal regulations: (1) usury ceilings that limited the interest
rates charged on long-term, fixed interest rate, home mortgages (long-term
mortgages), (2) ceiling on the interest rates paid on short-term saving's
deposits (short-term deposits), (3) limitations on branch locations within
states and across states where new branches would encroach on another
incumbent's territory, and (4) limitations on who could enter the depository
business, etc.
The second regulation was that federally chartered S&Ls had to meet
minimum net-worth (capital) levels, and it had to maintain internal
practices and procedures that geared toward safe practices.

It involved
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procedures for prudent underwriting loans through background checks on
borrowers' ability to repay their mortgage loans.

Finally, the third

regulation involved consumer information and protection regulation.
-· . " .

It

'

involved specified information disclosures on mortgage terms and deposit
terms. In addition, it focused on S&Ls lending practices of borrowing short
and lending long to local communities (White, 1991; Ermann and Lundman,
1992).

...
Despite the new law, most Americans who lived through the Great
Depression were not enthusiastic about putting their money into any
financial institutions.

In the darkest year of 1933, eighty-eight S&Ls

failed, and depositors lost almost $44 million (Pizzo, Fricker and
Muolo;
•
1989, p. 11). During the 1930s, 1,706 S&Ls failed, and depositors lost $200
million (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 11).

The public remained

..

circumspect of the financial system. Therefore, the federal government had
,.
to restore the public confidence in order for the financial system to recover

its strength.
On July 1, 1934, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) for the commercial-banking industry.

The FDIC

permitted mutual savings banks to join the Federal Reserve System.
However, they would not allow federally chartered S&Ls to become
members.

The S&L industry perceived that the FDIC gave banks a

competitive advantage. Thus, the U. S. League sought to obtain federal
deposit insurance for the industry.

As a result, the second principal

building block of the S&L industry was the National Housing_. Act of 1934
(Calavita and Pontell; 1990, p. 235)
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The National Housing Act of 1934 had two mam components.
First, the Act created federally guaranteed home mortgage insurance
administered by the new Federal Housing Administration (FHA).

The

FHA provided federal insurance against default by low-income home loan
borrowers and in the process distributes the availability of home loans
throughout the country (Day; 1993, p. 43). Second, the FHA guaranteed
long-term mortgages, twenty-year maturities, limited to 5 percent and 20
percent down payment of the home price (Rom; 1996, p. 31). President
Roosevelt expected that during the Great Depression, citizens would be
able to afford home mortgage loans under these terms.

Therefore, by

providing federal insurance for home mortgages, Congress believed it
would lead more lenders to make such loans (Rom; 1996, p. 31).
In addition, the National Housing Act established the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to insure federally
chartered S&L shareholder's short-term deposits up to $5,000 (Day; 1993,
p. 43). The FSLIC was to protect the system against massive withdrawal,
not to save federally chartered S&Ls from failure.

The federal

government did not back the FSLIC by Full Faith and Credit. Therefore,
the federal government was not legally obligated to assume responsibility
for insuring short-term deposits if the S&L industry collapsed.
Congress hoped that the establishment of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act of 1932, Home Owner's Loan Act of 1933, and the National
Housing Act of 1934 would promote the construction of new homes and
protect the S&L industry.

President Roosevelt's New Deal Reform

worked. Shareholders with FSLIC-insured accounts no longer lost money,

and they no longer feared losing money. In addition, homeowners did not
default on their mortgage loans. Home foreclosures declined in number
every year after 1933 to pre-depression levels by 1940 (Rom; 1996, p. 37).
Thus, the S&L industry entered a lengthy period of postwar growth and
prosperity for more than forty years (Brumbaugh, Jr.; 1988; Greider,
1990; Rom, 1996).
Postwar Growth and Prosperity

In 1940, the S&L industry was prosperous.

There were 7,521

federally chartered S&Ls with $5. 7 billion in assets (Eichler; 1989, p. 7).
S&Ls obtained most of their funds through short-term deposit accounts,
which were stable and low cost source of funds. Unlike banks, S&Ls were
exempt from interest rate ceilings, so they could obtain sufficient short
term deposit by paying slightly higher rates than banks.
S&Ls used most of their short-term deposits to make long-term
mortgages (Rom; 1996, p. 37). These deposits were the major source of
funds for investments in home mortgages. However, the United States
Government curtailed production of civilian goods when the government
got involved in World War II. The government placed emphasis on the
United States Military.

As a result, construction mortgage lending

became dormant (Strunk and Case; 1988, p. 20).
After World War II, the savings and loan industry was part of the
United States Economic Recovery efforts (Glasberg and Skidmore; 1991,
p. 27).

In 1944, Congress passed the Servicemen's Readjustment Act

known as the "GI Bill of Rights" (White; 1991, p. 57). Under the GI Bill,
the federal government guaranteed it would repay part of the GI loan
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under certain conditions that reduced the risk to lenders. In turn, the
lender granted long-term mortgages with smaller down payments and
charged veterans half a percentage point less than the going rate of 4.5
•
"

percent (Robinson; 1990, p. 14). As a result, GI loans were aIt major role in
•
the housing industry. Forty-four percent of S&L's long-term mortgages

were GI loans with $37.7 billion in assets (Brumbaugh Jr., 1988; Eichler,
1989). Thus, the regulatory framework established under the New Deal
Reform contributed to the economic growth and prosperity of the S&L
industry.
,
Throughout the post-Depression years, the S&L
industry enjoyed

an extremely favorable economic and competitive climate. S&Ls loans
grew along with the population, the economy, and especially, the housing
market. Between 1945 and 1965, the industry built over 30 million new
homes, and long-term mortgages financed the vast majority of home sales

.

.

. .. the world known as
(Rom; 1996, p. 37). As a result, the industry became

"3-6-3" (White; 1991, p. 59). S&L executives borrowed 3 percent interest
from shareholder's short-term deposits. They loaned it to homebuyers at
6 percent interest on long-term mortgages; and S&L executives were on
the golf course by 3:00 P.M.

This method was borrowing short and

lending long (White; 1991, p. 59).
The Potential Flaw of Borrowing Short and Lending Long

There was one potential flaw with the method of borrowing short
and lending long.

Throughout this period, the industry became

vulnerable to economic fluctuations. This weakness came about because
S&Ls financed long-term mortgages with short-term deposits.

If a
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volatile market interest rates increased it would expose the "maturity
mismatch" or "interest rate risk".

For example, S&Ls would be in a

dilemma, if S&Ls attempted to retain short-term deposits by raising the
interest rates paid, their profits would shrink. At some point, the profits
would disappear. If S&Ls did not raise the interest rates, they risked
shareholders withdrawing their short-term deposits and deposit them
where they could earn more interest. If this happened, S&Ls could either
attempt to maintain their size by borrowing funds elsewhere, which would
raise costs, or they could shrink, which would lower profits (Rom; 1996, p.
38).
In 1966, the potential flaw of borrowing short and lending long,
became a reality for the S&L industry. The industry began to experience
external pressures. As the United States stepped-up its involvement in
the Vietnam War, the federal government borrowed money to finance the
Vietnam conflict and President Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society
Program. Likewise, industries wanted to borrow money to increase their
plants and equipment, and consumers wanted to buy more goods on the
installment plan. At the same time, the Federal Reserve Board sought to
prevent inflation by limiting the supply of funds available for lending.
Under the United States Economic System, the price of an object
increases when the supply is unable to meet the demand. Money is no
exception to this rule. The cost of money is the interest a borrower must
pay. If money is scarce, the interest rate rises. As inflation increased, it
created higher interest rates exceeding the 3 percent interest that S&Ls
paid on short-term deposits. For example, in January 1964, short-term
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interest rates increased from 3.53 percent to 3.86 percent by December
1964.

In January 1965, it increased again from 3.83 percent to 4.36

percent by December 1965 (White; 1991, p. 62). In January 1966, the
interest rate continued to increase from 4.60 percent to 5.39 percent by
October 1966 (Rom; 1996, p. 40).

-

These interest rate increases had two important consequences for
the S&L industry.

First, shareholders began looking for financial

instruments that paid higher market interest rates. Commercial banks
benefited by offering higher interest rates on short-term deposits and
attracted funds that S&Ls would have otherwise received (Rom; 1996, p.
40). Second, home lending and home building suffered. Production of
single-family homes decreased to a decade low of 1.15 million (Eichler;
1989, p. 37). Because of the interest rate increase, the S&L industry lost
i
approximately $7 billion in home-construction
expenditures and an

estimated loss of 800,000 construction jobs (Marvell, 1969; Eichler, 1989).
The interest rates increase scared lawmakers into thinking that the
affordable home mortgages would perish if they did not act (Wilmsen;
1991, p. 38). Congress' initial response to the industry's external pressure
was to seek governmental control over the interest rates paid on short
term deposits. Congress' reasoning was that if S&Ls did not have to pay
too much for short-term deposits, S&Ls would not have to charge too
much for long-term mortgages (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 10).
Therefore, Congress decided to take control of interest rate ceilings.
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The Creation of Interest Rate Ceilings

In September 1966, Congress passed the Interest Rate Control Act
known as "Regulation Q" (White; 1991, p. 62). Regulation Q guaranteed
federally chartered S&Ls slightly higher interest rates on short-term

.

deposits than banks. The Bank Board set an interest rate ceiling
" at 3/4

·- .

percent of 1 percent more than commercial banks on short-term deposits
(Eichler; 1989, p. 23).

.
From September-December 1966, interest rate
#

ceiling on short-term deposits for commercial banks was 4 percent
compared to S&L's 4. 75 percent.

This was called "thrift differential"

(White; 1991, p. 62).

'

•
By January 1967, S&Ls began to attract new short-term deposits

that increased the industry's growth to $10. 7 billion in assets (Lowy;

..

1991, p. 15). Short-term accounts supplied three-fourths of all deposits in
S&Ls (Brumbaugh Jr.; 1988, p. 14).

Regulation Q was a powerful

..

marketing tool for the industry. "We pay more than any bank" was a

.
common advertising theme (Strunk and Case; 1988, p. 39). Thus, for the
remainder of the 1960s, the Interest Rate Control Act permitted S&Ls to
flourish without depriving homeowners of long-term mortgages.
The S&L industry entered the 1970s with 5,699 federally chartered
S&Ls with $17.6 billion in assets that continued to borrowed short and
lending long (Brumbaugh Jr.; 1988, p. 7).

S&Ls used those funds to

underwrite long-term mortgages for younger homebuyers. These buyers
reaped the benefits of borrowing at 8 percent or less a year to acquire
property that appreciated at 10 percent or more a year (Pilzer; 1989, p.
59). Meanwhile, Regulation Q had narrowed to 1/2 percent (Eichler; 1989,
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p. 23). From September 1970 to December 1970, the ceiling interest rate
on short-term deposits for commercial banks was 4.5 percent compared to
S&Ls 5.0 percent (White; 1991, p. 63). Again, this thrift differential
allowed S&Ls to continue to attract short-term deposits.

However,

several economic factors changed both the fortunes of the S&Ls and the
parameters within they operated.
The Consequences of Interest Rate Ceilings

A combination of events produced double-digit inflation and rising
interest rates that re-created the flaw of borrowing short and lending
long. Moreover, high interest rates and slow growth affected the S&L
industry. S&Ls were locked into long-term mortgages from previous era
that were limited by regulation to pay no more than 5.5 percent interest
on new short-term deposits (Ermann and Lundman; 1992, p. 236). As a
result, the industry found it difficult to attract new money when inflation
outpaced the 5.5 percent return on short-term deposits.
Meanwhile, President Richard M. Nixon was aware of the political
fallout from economic fluctuations. He attributed his 1960 defeat to the
mild recession of 1960-1961, caused by, or at least worsened by a
stringent money policy (Eichler; 1989, p. 34). President Nixon wanted
rapid growth and price stability.

He expected Federal Reserve

Chairperson Arthur Burns to help accomplish his goal by imposing wage
and price controls.

President Nixon allowed the Federal Reserve to

increase the money supply by letting the currency's value tumble around

.

at the whim of investors (Wilmsen; 1991, p. 38). Therefore, President
Nixon obtained the economic environment of high growth and low
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inflation at 3.4 percent that he wanted to win reelection (Pizzo, Fricker,
and Muolo; 1989, p. 333).
In 1972, President Nixon lifted the wage and price controls after
winning reelection. Chairperson Burns invoked a monetary restraint on
an economy that had a built-in bias toward price inflation at the slightest
opportunity.

Oil producers in the Middle East decided they were not

getting enough money for their crude oil, and oil prices skyrocketed. As a
result, it exacerbated the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) embargo that resulted in inflationary oil prices.
In October 1973, during the Arab-Israeli War, the Arab-dominated
OPEC announced an embargo on oil exports to the West, which caused a
dramatic increase in the price of crude oil from $2.50 to about $11 per
barrel (Simon and Eitzen; 1993, p. 68). The oil companies then announced
a dramatic storage of imported oil.

They stated,

"The demand for

domestic oil could do nothing but increase" (Seidman; 1993, p. 22).
Thereupon, the oil companies announced increased prices for domestic
crude oil equal to the increase of OPEC oil.

By 1974, the oil embargo

increased the consumer price index to 12.2 percent (Eichler, 1989;
Robinson, 1990; Seidman, 1993).
economic

forces,

and

a

new

Consequently, this affected other

word

entered

the

economic jargon,

"Stagflation" (Eichler; 1989, p. 34).
In April 1975, the nation experienced the first serious postwar
recession (Seidman; 1993, p. 22).

President Nixon's successor, Gerald

Ford and his administration inherited the high inflation that was a result
of the oil-embargo by the Arab states. President Ford's Administration
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attempted to solve the inflation problem by cutting government
expenditures, veto numerous spending bills that lowered the inflation rate
to about 6 percent, and interest rates decreased (Seidman; 1993, p. 22).
By January 1976, the economy had recovered and home sales began to

... 8.5 to
surge. The inflation rate remained at 6 percent, and S&Ls charged
9 percent interest on long-term mortgages (Eichler; 1989, p. 43).
During the 1976 Presidential Campaign, the nation got its first
warning of what to expect from Jimmy Carter.

Bert Lance, whose

Georgia bank was a crucial financial backer of Carter, told the press that
his friend had proved in Georgia politics that "he campaigns liberal, but
he governs conservative" (Sherrill; 1990, p. 592). As a candidate, Carter
promised that unemployment would be his top priority. As soon as he
became the 39th President of the United States, he switched and said,
"Winning business confidence was more important" (Sherrill; 1990, p.
592). He vowed that he would immediately push for bank deregulation.
In 1978, President Carter replaced Federal Reserve Chairperson
Burns with William Miller. The President opted for unrestrained money
to preclude a recession. He and Miller kept the GNP rising and held
unemployment in check at 6 percent with inflation at 6 percent (Eichler;
1989, p. 36).

Meanwhile, short-term interest rates on three-month

Treasury-bills paid 6.43 percent compared to Regulation Q's ceiling at
5.25 percent for short-term deposits at S&Ls (White; 1991, p. 68). S&Ls
shareholders realized that Regulation Q's interest rate was far below the
market rates for short-term investments.

As a result, shareholders

shopped for new investments with higher interest rates for their money.
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This competition came from mutual money market funds
(MMMFs). Reserve Fund of New York City, an innovative investment
company, introduced the first MMMFs that attracted S&L's shareholders

,,.
with at least $10,000 (White; 1991, p. 68). Reserve Fund offered between
•
10 and 12 percent interest rates on short-term deposits (Calavita
and

Pontell; 1990, p. 236).

As a result, the higher market interest rates

threatened the possibility for massive withdrawals of short-term deposits
from S&Ls (Pontell and Calavita; 1993, p. 33).
In response to the threat of S&L's short-term deposits, President
Carter's Administration and Congress developed a new view of the,.
industry's problems. The major cause of the industry's difficulties was
restrictions on long-term mortgages. As Congress saw it, "If the problem
was that shareholders were taking their money out of S&Ls in order to get
better returns available elsewhere, then why not simply let S&Ls
• pay

.. 1989, p 69). Therefore, the
shareholders higher rates" (Pilzer and Deitz;

Bank Board authorized a temporary savings certificate to be more
competitive in the higher interest rate environment.
On June 1, 1978, the Bank Board authorized S&Ls to offer a six
month "money-market certificate" (MMC) with a $10,000 minimum
deposit priced 1/2 percent above the six-month Treasury-bill rates that
fluctuated between 10 and 12 percent (Pilzer and Deitz, 1989; Lowy, 1991;
White, 1991; Foust, 1993). For the first time since 1966, S&Ls could pay
market interest rates on at least one form of deposits. These MMCs had
an immediate and massive effect on the industry. By November 1978,
S&Ls issued $34 billion in MMCs (Rom; 1996, p. 140).
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By January 1979, the elements of tragedy were in place.

The

..

industry relied on short-term deposits to finance long-term mortgages that
had a dangerous maturity mismatch.

By June 1979, 20 percent of all

S&L's short-term deposits were in six-month MMCs at 12 percent interest
rates (Brumbaugh Jr., 1988; Lowy, 1991).

However, the law required

S&Ls to invest those high-cost funds in long-term mortgages that earned
a lower interest rates than the 12 percent on MMCs (Pilzer and Deitz;
1989, p. 66). As a result, six-month MMCs cost the industry $5 billion a
year; exactly the amount the industry made in its best year (Lowy; 1991,
p. 16).
Meanwhile, President Carter appointed Paul Volcker to chair the
Federal Reserve Board to combat inflation (Long; 1993, p. 9). Chairperson
Volcker was a notoriously well-trained guard dog for the Eastern money
establishment.

He had been a Chase Manhattan banker, a Treasury

official in President Johnson and Nixon Administrations, and head
• of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The bankers knew that Volcker was
mean enough to destroy the economy to preserve the hardness of their
dollars (Lowy; 1991, p. 16).

,.
Volcker made a decision with pernicious

results for the S&L industry.
On

October

6,

1979,

Volcker announced that the federal

government would no longer try to restrain rampant inflation by holding
down interest rates.

Instead, the new policy abandoned interest rate

stability and focused on restricting the growth of the nation's money
supply to combat inflation (Ermann and Lundman; 1992, p. 236). Volcker
,r upperstated, "The standard of living of the average American [not the
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class] has to decline" (Sherrill; 1990, p. 592).

..
• I-"
Colleague
R. Dan

•.

Brumbaugh Jr., former deputy chief economist at the Federal Home Loan

.

. general
~--...
Bank Board, repeatedly warned Volcker that "his goals for the

•)t "' and
•
economy would have expensive consequences if he did not moderate

allow interest rates to fall" (Day; 1993, p. 60).

.., ... his
Volcker ignored

warnings. His strict control over the money supply sent interest rates to

•

13.3 percent and contributed to a serious recession (Ermann and
Lundman; 1993, p. 236). From October-December 1979, inflation reached
.,. American
almost 16 percent (Lowy; 1991, p. 17). As a result, the average

could not afford to buy a home, a car, and unemployment was 5. 7 percent
(Sherrill; 1990, p. 592).
Many S&L executives understood the devastating effect Volcker's
policy would have on their business. The effect was the cost of borrowing
• •

.

4-'
money. Before S&Ls could lend money for long-term mortgages, they had

_,
to have it. Shareholders withdrew their money from
their short-term

accounts that paid 5.5 percent, and they invested it in money market
funds that paid double-digit returns. As a result, S&Ls faced defaults and
foreclosures from the recession, combined with competition from high
yield investments given the new hikes in the interest rate (Ermann
and
•
Lundman; 1992, p. 236).
However, the Bank Board recognized that Regulation Q, the most
consistent regulation, undercut the S&Ls.

Regulation Q hindered the

ability for S&Ls to complete for short-term deposits. Therefore, the new
Bank Board Chairperson Preston Martin suggested two proposals that
would reduce S&Ls' interest rate risk. First, Martin's proposals would
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have allowed S&Ls to offer Adjustable Rate Mortgage loans (ARMs).
ARMs would have improve S&L's earnings during times of rising interest
rates by increasing the rate paid on long-term mortgages (Rom; 1996, p.
43). Second, if S&Ls could have made more investments other than home
mortgages, it would have reduced the interest rate risk. Martin argued
that other investments would have shorter maturities allowing S&Ls to
diversify into other business sectors (Rom; 1996, p. 44).
'\ ,
However, the political-economic decision of the House and Senate

Banking Committee blocked both proposals for improving the growth and
prosperity of the S&L industry.

Chairperson Senator Henry Proxmire

and Representative Fernard St. Germain indicated that they opposed
ARMs on the consumer's protection grounds.

They feared that S&Ls

would arbitrarily raise the interest rates on long-term mortgages (Pilzer
and Deitz; 1989, p. 68). Therefore, the Banking Committees believed that
Regulation Q was the solution to the industry's problems (Strunk and
Case; 1998, p. 46).
Because of this political-economic history, the government failed to
provide significant regulation for the S&L industry, which had been the
central backbone of financing homes for American citizens. The industry
operated in a volatile environment to the industry's home financing, an
environment created by the government that had actively blocked the
ability for S&Ls to compete for short-term deposits in order to provide
long-term mortgages, which caused many of S&Ls into insolvency.
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CHAPTER 3
WHERE DEREGULATION WENT WRONG:
SETTING THE STAGE FOR FAILURE
The history of the S&L's industry political economy revealed a state
m which it blocked the industry's effort to control its home financing
environment by a government favoring an anomalous industrial policy.
However, this political-economic climate alone does not explain the
complete dynamics that led to the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal. The
Bank Board could have closed Lincoln Savings when board members were
aware of Lincoln's risky investments and criminal activities. In addition,
regulators had the legal authority to seize Lincoln Savings from American
Continental.
What kept these federal agencies from closing or seizing Lincoln
Savings?

What led Congress to deregulate the S&L industry?

This

chapter answers the question in which the scandal occurred. It outlines
the specific pattern of the industrial relations among the S&L industry,
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Lincoln Savings, and American
Continental Corporation.
In January 1980, the S&L industry's 4,613 S&Ls, with $630 billion
m assets, entered into a new economic environment that affected the
market value of long-term mortgages (Eichler; 1989. p. 40). The consumer
price index stood almost 45 percent above where it had been when
President Gerald Ford left the White House (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p.
67).

The prime rate that commercial banks charged most corporate
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customers approached 20 percent (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 67). Both
inflation and interest rates were more than 12 percent (Eichler; 1989, p.
40). Because of the new economic environment, one-third of the industry's
S&Ls with 3 percent long-term mortgages lost $4.6 billion (Foust, 1993;
Rom, 1996).
Furthermore, the market value of home loans was far less than the
interest rate on S&L's six-month MMCs.

The average yield on S&L's

long-term mortgage portfolios was 8.8 percent. The interest rate on six
month MMCs was 14 percent (Eichler, 1989; Pilzer and Deitz, 1989). As a
result, eighty-five percent of the industry's S&Ls lost money (Sherrill;
1990, p. 594).

Industry analysts estimated that the liabilities would

exceed the market value of S&L's assets by almost $200 billion (Murry;
1992, p. 2).

The Solution for the S&L Industry's Difficulties
In an effort to reduce the adverse effects of the unexpected economic
forces, a new ideological movement gathered momentum.

The U.S.

League argued that the policies constituting the congressional mandate of
the 1930s were an anachronism, given the economic troubles of the 1970s
(Glasberg and Skidmore; 1997, p. 29). In the mid-seventies, congressional
actions began to turn against the savings and loan industry. Lincoln
Savings and other S&Ls was not the best route through which to promote
the housing industry.

Instead, Congress saw S&Ls as an inhibitor to

congressional socioeconomic goals and found them imposed with
additional operation expenses. Policy makers discussed lifting restrictions
on S&Ls to allow them to compete equitably for new money and invest
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those funds in lucrative ventures (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman; 1997, p.
11).

Therefore, Congress and the Bank Board both agreed that bank

deregulation was the solution for the industry's difficulties.
Bank deregulation would require a shift in the industry's structure.

'.,

This deregulatory shift would relax interest rate limits on S&Ls; it
removed restrictions on banking, real estate, and securities investments
·,
(Glasberg and Skidmore; 1997, p. 29). Congress'
supported deregulation

legislation for airlines, natural gas, communication, trucking and railroad
industries (White; 1991, p. 72).

Therefore, the majority of legislators

concurred to turn the S&L industry over to an autonomous industry of the
free market system.
Representative Fernando St. Germain, Chairperson of the House

...

Banking Committee, had been at the vanguard for deregulation of the
S&L industry.

His promotion of deregulation coincided with his cozy

relationship with lobbyists for the U.S. League (Calavita, and Pontell and
Tillman; 1997, p. 90). The U.S. League was the most powerful lobbying
group in Washington, D.C. When it came to thrift matters in the U.S.
Congress, the U.S. League and many of its affiliates were the de facto
government. "What the League wanted, it got. What it did not want from
Congress, it had killed" (Jackson and Thomas; 1989, p. Al).
U.S. League Chairperson William O'Connell bragged about the
influence enjoyed by his association. "Everything we tried to do we were
successful" (Calavita, Pontell and Tillman; 1997, p. 90).

The League

wanted deregulation. Therefore, Representative St. Germain sponsored
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act

43

(DIDMCA) that would increase the flow of S&L's short-term deposits by
relaxing the restrictions on Regulation Q interest rates.
Setting the Stage for Failure

On March 31, 1980, Congress passed and President Carter signed
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
•
designed to phase out Regulation Q over the riext six years (Simon and

Eitzen, 1993; Glasberg and Skidmore, 1997). In addition, the DIDMCA
included significant regulatory changes to extend the range of S&Ls'
investments:
(1) Federally chartered S&Ls could establish branch offices
and mobile facilities state wide within the home state and
100 miles from the home office.
(2) FSLIC members could borrow up to 50 percent of assets,
although they may pledge only 25 percent of assets to
secure outside borrowings.
(3) FSLIC members could make real estate loans with out
regard to the geographic location of the secured property.
(4) Federally chartered S&Ls could make loans in excess of
90 percent of value on one to four family properties.
(5) Statutory net-worth requirement reduced from 5 percent
of insured accounts to 3 percent, the amount by which
assets exceed liabilities (Brumbaugh Jr.; 1988, p. 42).
The lower net-worth requirement meant that S&Ls needed a
smaller capital base to comply with federal regulations.

S&Ls could

increase the total amount of loans they made with a smaller buffer
against losses, the higher the level of capital the more solid the S&L
(Robinson; 1990, p. 38).
At the same time the law unleashed S&Ls to compete for new

money, Congress bolstered the federal protection accorded to these
"private enterprise" institutions by increasing the FSLIC insurance... from a
.., n maximum of $40,000 to $100,000 per deposit (Ermann and Lundman;

1992, p. 237).

In a conference room in the United States Capitol,
•

members of the House and Senate held an esoteric meeting to produce a
bill that would compromise limits on increasing FSLIC insurance. The
Senate bill called for an increase to $50,000 (Calavita, Pontell, and
Tillman; 1997, p 92). The House bill included no increase (Lowy; 1991, p.
19). However, Representative St. Germain proposed a "compromise" limit
of $100,000 (Adams; 1990, p. 17).
Representative St. Germain and Senator Cranston persuaded
Representatives in the House and Senators in the Senate to increase the

.-

FSLIC insurance protection to $100,000 without any congressional debate
•
(Lowy; 1991, p. 19). Thus, the combination of net-worth requirement of 3

., from $40,000 to $100,000,
percent and increased FSLIC protection
allowed S&Ls access to unprecedented amounts of federally insured funds

•

to invest in the free markets. Since the maximum insured deposit was
$100,000, S&Ls packaged brokered deposits as $100,000 certificates of
deposit (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman; 1997, p. 12). S&Ls could raise
millions of dollars from the certificates of deposit if they paid the higher
interest rates (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 73). However, a new problem
arose.
The DIDMCA triggered an even more pronounced "negative rate
spread." S&Ls received new money at the higher interest rates to attract
short-term deposits, but they had to invest those funds at a lower rate in
•
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long-term mortgages.

As a result, insolvent S&Ls' losses measured in

billions of dollars (Edward J. Kane; 1987, p. 77). Yet, insolvent S&Ls
continued to exist because the FSLIC did not have enough funds to pay off
losses of that magnitude. By the end of December 1980, rising interest
rates took their toll on the economic health of the S&L industry. Industry
analysts estimated that almost half of the industry's 4,613 S&Ls would
lose $4 billion a year if insolvent S&Ls continue to operate in the red
(Pontell and Calavita; 1993, p. 34).
A New Administration Failed to Close Insolvent S&Ls
On January 20, 1981, President Ronald Reagan's Administration
prepared to take office. An anonymous memo on the S&L industry's crisis
circulated among members of the Reagan transition team.

"The new

administration may well face a financial crisis not of its own making.
Confidence in the entire financial system could evaporate" (Pilzer and
Deitz; 1989, p. 67). Therefore, The U.S. Treasury Department formulated
a set of policies to deal with the wave of S&L's failures:
(1) The current problem is interest rates. High interest rates
are due to inflation, which the administration is going to
cure. Therefore, the problem is temporary.
(2) The problem is a liquidity problem caused by interest rate
regulation. If Congress deregulates interest rates, S&Ls
will be able to attract funds. Therefore, Congress should
deregulate rates.
(3) There is no money in the budget for bailouts (Reagan had
been against the bailouts of New York City and Chrysler).
Therefore, if S&Ls need assistance that has no budgetary
cost to the government.
(4) The important thing is to get real deregulatory legislation
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to give S&Ls the same powers as commercial banks.
The administration did not believe that the negative net-worth was
,: not
significant. Therefore, the Treasury Department believed that it did

need to close insolvent S&Ls as long as they could get enough short-term

..

deposits to continue business (Lowy; 1991, p. 20).

In February 1981, President Reagan no.minated Richard Pratt, a
•
noted tough-minded professor of finance from Utah,
• as Chairperson of the
Bank Board (Mayer; 1993, p. 59). Pratt had been chief economist for the
•
U.S. League and understood the issues of economic deregulation (Pilzer

and Deitz; 1989, p. 71). Pratt put the problem in historical perspective at
his Senate confirmation hearing. He listed the factors that "threaten to
undermine the integrity" of the savings and loan industry:
(1) The rapid escalation in institutions' cost of funds fueled
by inflation and dramatic variations in interest rates is
causing serious shortfalls in earnings.
(2) The combination
competitive process
loan associations to
funds at costly open

of deregulation and the natural
in the market is forcing savings and
acquire an increasing portion of their
market rates.

(3) The growth of unregulated money market funds is
causing rapid disintermediation (withdrawal of funds)
and threatening the liquidity of thrift institutions, which
cannot compete for consumer savings on an equal basis.

......

(4) Low-yielding mortgage portfolios are not turning over
returns as quickly as in the past, since inflation and high
mortgage rates are encouraging
.. ' borrowers to continue to
hold their low-interest mortgages.

...

(5) In short, savings and loan associations may very often be
paying in excess of 15 percent for marginal funds, while
their lending portfolios are yielding 9 percent or less.
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Even the most basic financial analysis of such a situation
indicates a severe strain on liquidity, net worth, and
earnings (Lowy; 1991, p. 35).
On April 16, 1981, the House and Senate confirmed Richard Pratt
as the Bank Board Chairperson. Paraphrasing Winston Churchill, Pratt
said: "I have not been appointed chairman to preside over the demise of
this industry. We are going on to bigger and better things" (Robinson;
1990, p. 39). He declared that the primary thrust of his administration
would be to expand the powers to S&Ls and reduce regulations (Lowy;
1991, p. 21).
During Pratt's first month in office, the Bank Board authorized all
federally chartered S&Ls to participate in ARMs (Mayer; 1993, p. 61).
ARMs had low "Teaser" introductory rates that made it easier for
homebuyers to qualify for long-term mortgages (Robinson; 1990, p. 39).
ARMs became popular with the industry because they allowed S&Ls to
raise mortgage payments from homeowners to adjust for increases in
interest rates. Thus, if Congress had allowed ARMs in 1976, the industry
might have avoided the massacre of the Carter-Volcker years (Sherrill;
1990, p. 597).
In May 1981, interest rates increased to more than 16 percent,
triple the level of five years earlier (Rom; 1996, p. 46). However, S&Ls
paid an average of 10.31 percent for short-term deposits and earned an
average of 9. 72 percent on long-term mortgages (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p.
71). The discrepancy between the higher interest rates S&Ls paid for
short-term deposits and the low interest rates they earned in long-term
mortgages widened. The industry lost $1.5 billion in six months, more
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than 5 percent of their total net-worth (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 71). As
a result, the S&L industry looked like this:
(1) Seventy-five percent of all federally chartered S&Ls
were
sure to lose money in 1981.

(2) About 50 federally chartered S&Ls were insolvent unless
...
interest rates turned around and another 300 were sure
to become insolvent in the next year.
(3) More than 1,000 federally chartered S&Ls could not meet
traditional 5 percent net-worth requirements; 500 could
not meet even a 3 percent requirement.
(4) The healthiest federally chartered S&Ls would be
insolvent in less than two years if interest rates did not
decrease.
(5) For these reasons, it was foreseeable that if traditional
regulatory practices were followed, FSLIC would have to
liquidate $300-$400 billion out of $750 billion in industry
assets at a net cost of 15 percent to 25 percent, for a total
of $45 billion to $100 billion.
(6) The FSLIC fund had $6 billion and $750 million line of
credit with the U.S. Treasury (Lowy; 1991, p. 35).
The Bank Board believed that consumers would lose confidence if
the public knew the facts. The Bank Board's goal was to keep insolvent
S&Ls in business by making them appear to have some net-worth, when
in fact, they had none or significantly, less than the law required. Two
hundred insolvent S&Ls required monetary assistance from the FSLIC
(Lowy, 1991; Calavita, Pontell and Tillman, 1997). However, the industry
was insolvent by $150 billion (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 71).
Pratt stated, "At that rate of decline, the virtual elimination of the
S&L industry is more than a theoretical possibility. Obviously, the 1980
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legislation had not done its job" (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 72). Forbes
Magazine observed, "You can't borrow at 12 percent to invest at 9 percent
unless you are prepared to let your company go down the drain. However,
that is exactly what's happening at many savings and loans" (Sloan; 1982,
p. 83). However, Congress could not allowed the S&L industry to collapse
because a massive default would have posed too much of a threat to the
country's financial stability.
The Bank Board Push for New Deregulation Legislation

It was not until the deregulatory fervor of the early Reagan
Administration that deregulation strategy gained political acceptance as a
solution to the rapid escalation of the S&L crisis. The Administration
believed that the "free enterprise" system worked best if left alone
unhampered, by perhaps well meaning, but ultimately counter productive
government regulations (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman; 1997, p. 11). The
constraints that bind the industry seemed to confirm the theory that
government regulations imposed an unfair handicap in the competitive
process.
The Housing Commission recommended a statement approvmg
direct investments in real estate by federally chartered S&Ls.

"Thrift

institutions should be permitted to invest in real estate of various types
only through service corporations or holding companies. The separation of
real estate activities from the deposit-taking entity is necessary for the
protection of federally insured deposits in these institutions" (Pilzer and
Deitz; 1989, p. 73). Therefore, legislators told the S&Ls executives, "If
you need to earn more money on investments, go out and invest in
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businesses that will earn you more money" (Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 73).
Therefore, Congress prescribed more deregulation when the DIDMCA did
not work.
In October 1981, the Bank Board pushed for new legislation that
would get insolvent S&Ls back to solvency. Pratt offered the Bank Board
new powers that would make the industry · more attractive such as
demand deposits to any customer, corporations, and to make corporate,
•
commercial and agricultural loans (Robinson; 1990, p. 40). Pratt believed
that luring new private capital was the only way to re-capitalize the

.. (Lowy; 1991, p. 46).
industry without enormous government assistance
Therefore, Pratt wrote the proposal that codified the new incentives the
government gave the industry.
Utah's Republican Senator Jake Garn, Chairperson of the Senate
Banking Committee and Representative St. Germain introduced the bill
known as "The Pratt Bill" (Sherrill; 1990, p. 597).

On the one hand,

Senator Garn favored legislation that would restructure the S&L industry

...
and make it more like commercial banks (Sherrill; 1990, p. 597). The
thrust of Senator Garn's legislative proposal rested on forbearance, the
official policy of encouraging regulators to tolerate problems and
look the
•
other way during hard times.
On the other hand, Representative St. Germain wanted to preserve
the industry.

He sought to maintain a semblance of the industry's

original housing mission. Therefore, the Pratt bill went through Congress
with few hearings in the Senate or the House Banking Committees (Day;
1993, p. 117).

Representative St. Germain and Majority Leader Jim
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Wright muscled into law the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act (Garn-St. Germain Act).
The Garn-St. Germain Act expanded the investment powers of
federally chartered S&Ls further away from their traditional role as
providers of long-term home mortgages. The Act allowed S&Ls to use
short-term deposits it received for long-term mortgages and invest those
funds in commercial real estate, or insubordinate debentures (junk bonds)
(Pilzer and Deitz; 1989, p. 75). This policy had several goals for making
S&Ls profitable:
(1) Increase S&Ls' consumer loans up to 30 percent of their
assets, commercial, corporate or business loans.
(2) Offer certificates of deposit of $100,000 denomination free
of withdrawal penalties and limits on interest rates, and a
wide variety of other kinds of accounts
. (3) Invest up to 40 percent (up from 20 percent) of the
savings and loan assets in nonresidential real estate
lending (e.g., shopping centers, condo, and apartment
projects).
( 4) Maintain a capital reserve of 3 percent.
(5) Remove requirement of down payments on loans from
borrowers. S&Ls could finance up to 100 percent of a deal
with borrowers not having paid a cent of their money on a
loan.
(6) Transform S&Ls from mutual institutions to stock
institutions in an effort to raise new capital.
(7) Remove requirement that S&Ls have at least 400
shareholders and no one shareholder could own more
than 25 percent of the stock. This allows a single investor
to own and operate a federally chartered S&L (Kane,
1989).
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Thus, an entrepreneur could: (1) start or buy an S&L for $3 million,
(2) attract $100 million in federally insured short-term brokered deposits

.

by offering to pay 10 percent interest, (3) loan that $100 million by
purchasing mortgage-backed securities paying 12 percent.

•.
If interest

rates fell by 1 percent point, the $100 million mortgage-backed securities
•
could be sold for $107 million or a profit of $71 million more than twice
the S&L owner's original equity investment, (4) pocket $18 million in
points and fees, (5) package the loans and sell them to other S&Ls, and (6)
start all over (Ferguson; 1993, p. 127).
Moreover, the potential for profits was spectacular in junk bonds
investments. An S&L owner could put $100 million of federally insured
funds into higher-yield, higher-risk junk bonds paying 16 or 17 percent
interest. The owner's entire $3 million investment could be repaid in the
first six months and doubled every year thereafter. What an S&L owner
T
had at stake was 3 percent of the $100 million (Pilzer and Deitz;
1989, p.

130). The Garn-St. Germain Act encouraged S&Ls to take excessive risks
because the FSLIC would pick-up the pieces if the bonds became
worthless (Greider; 1989, p. 29).
The financial difficulty that the S&L industry faced, could have
increased the likelihood of decisions, which placed profitability ahead of
the establishment of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1933, the Home
Owner's Loan Act of 1933, and the National Housing
Act of 1934 that
•
promoted the construction of new homes and protected the industry. This
interpretation would be consistent with Marshall Clinard and Peter
Yeager's findings, which suggest that the greater the financial strain
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faced by business, the greater the likelihood they will engage m
regulatory violations (Clinard and Yeager, 1980).
Regardless of the new economic environment, the industry faced or
its policies of the 1930s may have provoked, the Bank Board could have
intervened in a way that would have protected Lincoln Savings from
American Continental. What were the factors that disrupted the ability of
the federal regulators to regulate the conditions at Lincoln Savings?
There are two main issues.

First, there is evidence to suggest that

Congress dismantled the industry's regulatory infrastructure and relaxed
regulations that made it possible for American Continental to commit
criminal fraud at Lincoln Savings. Second, the Bank Board failed on two
occasions to take unheeded warnings about real estate developers as
proprietors of S&Ls.

The Dismantling of the S&L Industry's Regulatory Infrastructure
On October 15, 1982, President Reagan invited 200 people to the
Rose Garden Ceremony to witness the signing of the Garn-St Germain
Act. President Reagan recognized it as one of his administration's major
pieces of deregulation legislation (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 1).
He told the audience of S&Ls executives, bankers, Congressmen, and
journalists that they were there to witness a major step toward the
deregulation of America's financial institutions.
President Reagan promised the American people that he would get
government "off their backs" by deregulating the private sector (Eichler;
1989, p. 36).

He believed that government stifled businesses and

taxpayers, and the economy would thrive if the dead hand of regulation
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were lifted from the enterprising spirit of the American people. He stated,

,. their
"For 50 years, American families had relied on S&Ls to finance
homes, but outmoded regulations left over from the era• of the Great
•
. , complex
Depression were preventing thrifts from competing in the

.,
sophisticated financial marketplace of the 1980s" (Rom; 1996, p. 47). "The

Garn-St. Germain Act would cut savings and loan loose from the tight
girdle of old-fashioned restrictive federal regulation" (Pizzo, Fricker, and
Muolo; 1987, p. 1).
President Reagan further stated, "It is the most significant piece of
•
banking legislation
since 1933" (Lowy; 1991, p. 49). "It will mean more

housing, more jobs, and growth for the economy" (Pizzo, Fricker, and
Muolo; 1989, p. 1). "Garn-St. Germain puts thrifts back into the housing
arena"(Rom; 1996, p. 274).

"All in all, I think we've hit the jackpot"

(Waldman and Thomas; 1990, p. 27). In a few bold strokes, policy makers
dismantled most of the regulatory infrastructure that kept the S&L
industry together for almost five decades.

No longer were S&Ls

committed to long-term, fixed interest rate, home mortgage loans
• (Cottrell
and Lawlor, 1995). Therefore, Lincoln Savings became prime targets for
fast-talking "High Roller" real estate developer, Charles H. Keating Jr.,
owner and Chief Executive Officer of American Continental Corporation, a
real estate company based in Phoenix, Arizona (Calavita, Pontell, and
Tillman, 1997).
Bank Board Warned of Problems

Known for big salaries and lavish spending in his days as C.E.O. of
American Continental Corporation, Keating became a symbol of the
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savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. He grew up in a most intense S&L
environment operated by German-Americans in Hamilton County of
southern Ohio (Day; 1993, p. 129). He and his brother, William Keating,
founded the prominent Cincinnati law firm of Keating, Muething and
Klekamp (Adams; 1990, p. 238). As a lawyer, Keating bought S&Ls, sold
S&Ls, and did work for and against S&Ls. For this reason, Keating's
associate Michael Milken, "Junk Bond King" at Drexel Burnham Lambert
(Drexel), learned that American Continental Corporation could make
great profits from corporate bonds at marginal S&Ls that were candidates
for corporate takeovers (Simon and Eitzen; 1993, p. 3).
Milken told Keating to buy an S&L located in California as a way
to secure funds for American Continental (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo;
1989, p. 389).

California had the most liberal laws in the country on

investing federally insured funds (Long; 1993, p. 38). California's 1983
Nolan Law Act permitted owner of a state-chartered S&Ls to invest 100
percent of federally insured funds in real estate (Day; 1993, p. 210).
Therefore, the S&L that caught Keating's attention was Lincoln Savings
in Irvine, California.
In the early 1980s, Lincoln Savings faced the double-digit interest
rate risk like most S&Ls. It was unprofitable and close to insolvency.
,
..
Lincoln's portfolio had low-yield long-term mortgages
of 6 to 8 percent.
.

'

However, Donald Crocker, owner of Lincoln Savings, paid 15 percent
interest rate to attract and keep short-term deposits (Day; 1993, p. 70).
As a result, Lincoln's net-worth vanished because of the economic
conditions.
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In August 1983, Crocker received a phone call from an investment
banker. The banker stated that he had a buyer for Cracker's stock at $16
a share. Lincoln Savings' stock traded at $8 a share, but Crocker was not
interested (Day; 1993, p. 207). Lincoln Savings was a family business,
with more than 40 percent of the shares in the hands of Crocker, his
brother, and his two sisters (Mayer; 1993, p: 170).

Two weeks later,

Crocker received a call from a prominent Los Angeles lawyer who asked
about selling Lincoln Savings.

The lawyer told Crocker that he had a

client who wanted to pay $16 a share or $40 million for Lincoln Savings
(Day; 1993, p. 208). The lawyer revealed his client as Charles H. Keating
Jr.
On September 23, 1983, Keating offered Crocker between $40
million and $50 million dollars for Lincoln Savings (Day; 1993, p. 208).
Keating raised his price to $20 a share for Lincoln's stock. Keating told
Crocker that he could raise $51 million through Drexel to buy Lincoln
Savings (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 389). Crocker told Keating,
"Even though he was the controlling shareholder, he had to discuss the
deal with the other shareholders" (Day; 1993, p. 209).
Crocker had a concern for his employees.

In addition,

He wanted to know how

Keating would handle the personnel.
Keating promised Crocker that anyone who wanted to stay would
be able to stay at Lincoln Savings (Mayer; 1993, p. 171).

Keating

promised to continue operating Lincoln Savings as a traditional thrift that
specialized in home lending (Day; 1993, p. 209). Crocker decided that the
deal might work. After meeting with Lincoln's officials and shareholders,

..
$50 million in cash was more than twice Lincoln's market value (Day;
I
1993, p. 209). Therefore, Crocker decided to sell Lincoln Savings
to

American Continental Corporation.
On September 30, 1983, Crocker and Keating signed a definitive
agreement for the sale of Lincoln Savings (Day; 1993, p. 209). Drexel filed

..

an underwriting of American Continental's · stock to the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC). Drexel claimed that American
' Continental
described itself as the largest homebuilder in Colorado, Arizona, and the
seventh largest homebuilder in the country (Mayer; 1993, p. 172).
•
However, federal regulators worried about real estate developers as

proprietors of S&Ls (Mayer; 1993, p. 169). James Corona, president of the
Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB-SF) in San Francisco, was reluctant to
proceed on the sale of Lincoln Savings to American Continental. Corona

•

warned the Bank Board about American Continental Corporation as a
proprietor of Lincoln Savings:

..

First, there was no evidence of any S&L industry experience
among the senior officers of American Continental
Corporation. Second, being an out-of-state entity raised
concerns of federally insured funds flowing from California to
support activities that would not benefit the association's
local community. Finally, supervisory problems had already
become apparent with firms associated with real estate
development corporations owning savings and loans (Mayer;
1993, p. 170).

..

However, American Continental addressed those concerns through
a new application. Keating promised the Bank Board that he would keep
the current Lincoln Savings' senior management
subsequent to
•
acquisition. He stated that American Continental would not interrupt the

57

58

association's current program of community home lending in Southern
He gave assurance that American Continental would not

California.

violate any regulations pertaining to affiliated transactions.

Finally,

Keating promised that Lincoln Savings would obtain funds through short
term deposits and not brokered funds (Lowy; 1991, p. 97). Therefore, with
these reassurances without imposing any special controls, American
Continental won the approval from the SEC for the purchase of Lincoln
Savings.
Overall, the evidences suggest that Congress dismantling the S&L
industry's regulatory infrastructure and the Garn-St. Germain Act
allowed American Continental to buy Lincoln Savings. Furthermore, the
regulators had concerns about American Continental as owner of Lincoln
Savings.

In addition, the evidence suggests that there was no S&L

experience among senior officers of American Continental. There were
concerns about American Continental removing federally insured funds
from California to support activities that would not benefit the
community. Finally, there had been prior problem with S&Ls associated
with real estate development corporations that own S&Ls.
This represented a critical organizational flaw in the S&L industry
where Keating address the regulator's concerns through a new
application.

In the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal, this flaw was a

significant factor in several fraudulent investments and 23,000 Lincoln
Savings' members who invested $250 million in worthless junk bonds.
The Failure of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board

The Bank Board had a specific reason to deny American
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Continental access to Lincoln Savings. In 1979, the,.. SEC brought forth a
civil fraud suit against Keating, Muething, and Klekamp (Adams; 1990, p.
239). American Financial Corporation, a Cincinnati conglomerate
• owned
by Carl H. Lindner.

The SEC alleged that Keating and Lindner

l • and
fraudulently converted $14 million in assets for their personal use

...
made improper loans on preferential terms to American Financial
Corporation insiders (Jeffrey; 1990, p. 18).
Keating and Lindner settled and signed a consent cease-and-desist
decree (Kelly; 1987, p. 80).

The consent decree meant that both men

-

..,
..
entered no defense without admitting guilt
and agreed
not to violate the
l
law in the future. However, such an agreement
allowed the corporation
•
• . ' to

•r
... (Pepinsky
I
avoid admitting fault in future civil suits by private citizens

and Jesilow; 1992, p. 65). The evidence suggests
• that the\ consent• decree
4

and regulators' concerns did not prevent the sale of Lincoln Savings to
American Continental.
On February 22, 1984, the Bank Board and California State
Regulator Lawrence Taggart approved the change of control for Lincoln
Savings to American Continental (Day; 1993, p. 209).

Keating paid

Crocker $51 million for the purchase of Lincoln Savings
(Yang, 1990;
"
Simon and Eitzen, 1993). The transaction increased Lincoln's regulatory
capital over $96 million, and its net-worth was $54 million (Lowy; 1991, p.
147). Therefore, American Continental had its hands on Lincoln Savings'
f
$1 billion in federally insured funds (Rudnitsky; 1989, p. 142).
Consequently, the failure of the Bank Board, and the SEC to prevent the
sale of Lincoln Savings set the stage for the crime to follow.
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CHAPTER4
THE LINCOLN SAVINGS & LOAN SCANDAL
A competitive economy dominated by a profit-seeking corporation, a
government

committed

to

offering

an

attractive

profit-making

environment, the dismantling of the S&L industry's infrastructure,
regulatory agencies' who failed to protect the S&L industry, and five U.S.
Senators with political power to influence the regulatory structure of the
industry, all contributed to the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal.
However, these events alone did not cause the scandal. Therefore, it is
important to examine the ways in which the activities of the Bank Board
intersected with the activities of American Continental. The scandal may
have resulted from action taken by management at American Continental
and Lincoln Savings, but the failure of several government regulatory
control agencies made those actions possible.
In the case of the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal, the critical
intersections were between several government agencies and private
business. At involved the federal level, the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, the San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank, the Federal
Enforcement Review Committee.

At the state level, involved was the

California State Regulatory Agency.

In the private business sector

involved American Continental Corporation. By omission, each of these
state agencies failed to perform the control functions assigned to them
that made it possible for the continuation of fraudulent investments at
Lincoln Savings that led to criminal fraud. Therefore, this case study will
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examine the details of the scandal and then discuss the way in which each
control failed within the specific context of American Continental's
operation of Lincoln Savings.
The Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal

In order for the Bank Board to protect Lincoln Savings and its
members, the Bank Board should have recognized the problems that could
have happen if American Continental took possession of Lincoln Savings.
The evidences in the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal indicate that the
significant changes of the Garn-St. Germain Act allowed American
Continental to make a host of fraudulent investments in commercial loans
with federally insured funds.
In September 1984, immediately after American Continental
Corporation acquired Lincoln savings, Keating violated the assurances
that induced approval of the sale from the Bank Board and the California
Savings and Loan Commission (Morganthau and Clift; 1989, p. 35).
Despite Keating's promises, he fired all of Lincoln's senior management.
He claimed that he had to dismiss the executives because they were
incompetent (Lowy; 1991, p. 97). Thus, he replaced them with American
Continental staffers who had no banking experience to operate Lincoln
Savings.
In addition, Keating changed the course of Lincoln Savings and
transformed it from a traditional home mortgage lender into a hodgepodge
of risky investments (Mayer; 1993, p. 171).

American Continental

invested $2.7 billion in junk bonds, $20.7 million in commercial real
estate projects and in several corporate subsidiaries to increase Lincoln
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Savings' profits (Adams, 1990; Mayer, 1993).

Furthermore, Keating

booked a spurious earning for American Continental on a real estate
project called rancho Vistoso, in Tucson, Arizona. Lincoln Savings lost
$75 million on the $115 million it lent on the project (Long; 1993, p. 38).
Finally, American Continental's largest land-development project was
29,000 acres of desert called Estrella housing sub-division, west of
Phoenix near Goodyear, Arizona (Pizzo and Muolo; 1993, p. 109). Keating
pronounced that when he finished this project, "He would have fathered a
new city of 200,000 people" (Wilmsen; 1991, p. 130). However, real estate
experts judged Estrella's potential might take ten to fifteen years to
develop and would probably make back only half its projected costs
(Seidman; 1993, p. 231).
American Continental's most expensive venture was a $300 million
opulent resort hotel, The Phoenician, located in Scottsdale, Arizona
(Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 39). The Phoenician boasted of the lavish
appointments found in Europe's most celebrated resorts blended with the
style and ambience of the great American Southwest. The Phoenician
rose from the base of Camelback Mountain, amidst 130 acres of sparkling
pools, fountains, waterfalls, lush landscaping, capacious comfort, and
exquisite dining. The main lobby presented its stately marble, Italian
crystal chandeliers, and compelling valley view at one of the premier
resorts m the world.

The Phoenician was one of the world's most

distinctive resorts situated in the Valley of the Sun (Seidman; 1993, p.
231).
In addition, to build the Phoenician's six-hundred-room resort was
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a record cost of $500,000 per room (Day; 1993, p. 209). Four hundred and

'

forty-two roomy guestrooms, each averaging 600 square feet, one hundred
,t

and seven elegant casitas, thirty-one luxurious suites, including two
3,2000 square feet Presidential suites (Seidman; 1993, p. 230).

Its

opulence guaranteed it was never going to be profitable unless the hotel
could charge the unattainable sum of $5,000 a night for every room in the
hotel (Seidman; 1993, p. 230). The standard guideline for hotel rates is
that the nightly room charge should be one percent of the total capital
costs of a room. The Phoenician's rooms each cost $500,000, so the hotel
•
had to average $5,000 a night for a least 70 percent of the year to make
money (Seidman; 1993, p. 230). It is the most costly and luxurious hotel

..

ever built in the United States (Seidman; 1993, p. 230).
'
Apparently, the network of federal regulators
never made follow-up

checks to see if Keating kept his word to Crocker. If the San Francisco
regulators had done a follow-up, it would have seen that from the very
beginning American Continental was out of control. Because of American
Continental's new ventures, Lincoln Savings became the leading opponent
of the new Bank Board's proposal to limit direct investments by state
chartered S&Ls.
The Bank Board's new Chairperson, Edwin Gray, saw that Lincoln
Savings' direct investments were risky, and the industry could not afford
additional risks. Therefore, Gray launched a regulatory counter offensive.
He proposed a new capital regulation aimed at preventing state-chartered
S&Ls from investing over 10 percent of their assets in direct investments
(Dwyer, 1989; Lowy, 1991).

The direct investment-rule (equity rule)
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imposed by the Bank Board was a way of limiting Lincoln Savings'
exposure to financial risk. Thus, the limit was a direct threat to American
Continental's plan for Lincoln Savings' funds guaranteed under the
California's Nolan Act of 1983. Therefore, Keating was quick to respond
to the new regulatory threat.
In September 1985, Keating made his next move between American
Continental and Lincoln Savings to avoid the new equity rule. American
Continental found a legal way around the Bank Board's new regulation.
Keating created a maze of subsidiaries that made it difficult, if not
impossible, to trace where American Continental invested Lincoln
Savings' federally insured funds.
Crescent Hotel Group of Michigan, Inc. (CHG/M), a subsidiary of
Lincoln Savings, bought the Hotel Pontchartrain, a 422 unit-hotel in
downtown Detroit, for $19.5 million dollars (Einstein and Bowden; 1993,
p. 55). Keating formed Hotel Pontchartrain Limited Partnerships (HPLP)
as a subsidiary of American Continental.

,
HPLP bought the Hotel

Pontchartrain from CHG/M. Lincoln Savings loaned $38 million to one of
its subsidiaries, Lincoln Commercial Properties (LCP), which loaned the
$38 million to CHG/M. HPLP then borrowed $38 million from CHG/M in
order to buy the hotel from CHG/M (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 56).
Through a series of transactions, American Continental loaned $38
million of Lincoln Savings' money to buy the Hotel Pontchartrain.

If

Lincoln Savings put $38 million directly into the Hotel Pontchartrain, this
would be illegal as self-dealing.

However, the loan enable American

Continental to repay $10 million that Lincoln Savings had previously
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advanced to the partnership to service the debt of Hotel Pontchartrain
and to obtain $3.8 million in tax benefits (Long; 1993, p. 39).
In December 1985, Lincoln Savings avoided the equity rule by
swappmg

loans

between

American

Continental

and

Southmark

Corporation. American Continental loaned $129 million to Southmark
and its subsidiary, San Jacinto Savings & Loan Association in Houston,
Texas (exceeding the loans-to-one-borrower [LTOB] limit). Not only did
this net American Continental handsome up front fees, points, and
dividends, but also Southmark returned the favor. Southmark loaned
American Continental $35 million for its projects (Calavita, Pontell, and
Tillman; 1997, p. 26). Because of loan swapping, American Continental
and Southmark exchanged about $246 million in existing mortgages.
American Continental booked $12 million in profits from the swaps (Pizzo,
Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 400).
In addition, Lincoln Savings swapped real estate between American
Continental and Mizell Development Corporation (MDC) to avoid the
equity rule.

MDC was a real estate subsidiary of Denver's Columbia

Savings & Loan Association, (an associate of Southmark subsidiary).
American Continental and MDC worked together to trade land parcels
back and forth. Lincoln's subsidiary AMCOR bought 6,000 undeveloped
home sites from MDC. In turn, MDC received a $75 million line of credit
from Lincoln Savings and bought nearly 4,000 undeveloped home sites
from AMCOR (Wilmsen; 1991, p. 130). These procedures protected the
value of bad loans known as "trading the dead horse for the dead cow"
(Mayer; 1993, p. 70). These trades generated spurious profits and gave
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appraisers a pretext to mcrease appraised values of land m that
neighborhood.
Meanwhile, Arthur Andersen Accounting firm [The accounting firm
involved in the Enron Scandal] learned that federal regulators were on
their way to Lincoln Savings for a scheduled examination.

The firm

dispatched a team of auditors to Lincoln Savings to falsify, backdate, or
"stuff files" with documents considered vital to Lincoln's investments
(Davis; 1997, p. 31).

For instance, if a loan lacked documentation,

underwriting, and appraisals, this meant the employees must correct it to
regulators' standards. If a direct investment was in excess of the new
equity rule, this meant that employees must fine a way to characterize it
as a loan and not a direct investment. If a deal involved executives at
American Continental, regulators viewed Lincoln Savings' activities as
illicit insider trading or self-dealing.

This meant that American

Continental must restructure Lincoln Savings through subsidiaries to
avoid self-dealing (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 221).
On March 12, 1986, FHLB-SF regulators became wary of Lincoln's
explosive growth and began their scheduled examination at Lincoln
Savings (Adams; 1990, p. 243).

Regulators suspected that American

Continental made too many risky investments with Lincoln Savings'
federally insured funds (Day, 1993; Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman, 1997).
By July 1986, regulators uncovered 54 loans and investments without
supporting credit reports or analysis on borrowers.

These loans and

investments were in violations of federal law (Borger and Hedges; 1989, p.
21).
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Furthermore, regulators discovered that American Continental and
Arthur Andersen's employees collaborated in "stuffing files" (Mayer; 1993,
p. 191). The employees crammed files with backdated documents that
intended to mislead and defraud regulators. They gave many conflicting
'
reasons for their state of affairs.

However, the most persuasive
-·

explanation came from Lincoln's in-house legal counsel, Mark Sauder.
Sauder stated, "The cut and pasted documents had been put in the files
for examiners to find and for no other reason" (Davis; 1997, p. 35).
Therefore, this act was a criminal violation of federal law.
In October 1986, regulators determined that Lincoln Savings had
behaved as if the equity rule did not exist. They discovered that Lincoln
Savings had $135 million in unreported losses on loan swaps that
generated paper profits.

..

Specifically, the audit showed that Lincoln

Savings had broken the 10 percent equity rule by $615 million
(Morganthau and Clift, 1989; Adams, 1990). There was evidence that

,
loans, real estate investments, and purchases of junk bonds accounted for

62 percent of Lincoln's assets (Lowy; 1991, p. 147). Clearly, this was in
violation of the equity rule.
The regulators finished their examination of Lincoln Savings and
concluded that the underwriting for these investments were deficient,
nonexistent, and fraudulent (Jeffrey; 1990, p. 19).

Lincoln's losses

stemmed from over-appraisals of property values and direct equity
investments that failed.

The regulators recommended that the Bank

Board close Lincoln Savings (Borger and Hedges; 1989, p. 19). However,
Keating and his lawyers accused the bank examiners of being biased and
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forced the exammers to justify every detail of their report.

Keating

stated, "He would fight to service the Hotel Pontchartrain, The
Phoenician Hotel, and the Estrella Sub-division, which all lost money
(Einstein and Bowden, 1993; Day, 1993; Mayer; 1993). Therefore, Keating
contacted five United States Senators to intervene in the closing of
Lincoln Savings.
Keating called on Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona), Senator
Donald Riegle (D-Michigan), Senator Alan Cranston (D-California),
Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio), and Senator John McCain (R-Arizona).
Keating asked the Senators to intervene with federal regulators to
prevent them from closing Lincoln Savings for its direct investments. He
told the Senators that the Bank Board's equity rule represented a change
in policy that unfairly hurt American Continental and Lincoln Savings
(Day; 1993, p. 262). He wanted them to protect Lincoln Savings and get
Gray and regulators "off his back" (Mayer, 1993; Seidman, 1993).
Campaign disclosure forms provided a rare insight into the
methods of fund-raising by the five Senators. They received substantial
campaign contributions from American Continental Corporation. Since
1984, the Senators received approximately $1.9 million in campaign
contributions from American Continental (Clift, 1989; Adams; 1990).
Senator DeConcini received $55,000 (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p.
290). Senator Cranston received $39,000 for his 1986 campaign, $850,000
for three voter education projects, and $85,000 for a California Democratic
Party voter drive (Dwyer, 1990; Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo, 1989; Day,
1993).

In addition, Senator Cranston received $400,000 for a get-out-and
vote fund (Dwyer, 1989; Adams; 1990).

Senator McCain received

$112,000. In addition, he received nine private plane trips worth $13,433
to the Bahamas from 1984 through 1986 (Day; 1993, p. 262). Senator
Glenn received $234,000 (Day; 1993, p. 262).
$76,100 (Carlson; 1989, p. 27).

Senator Riegle received

Thus, Keating claimed, "American

Continental Corporate contribution's support and campaign for the
political leaders we believe represent the best of American virtues"
(Jeffrey; 1990, p. 20).
The evidence suggests that the intervention of the Senators
restrained the Bank Board and federal regulators from taking action
against Lincoln Savings. In March of 1987, Ed Gray visited with Senator
Riegle at his Capitol Hill office. Gray hoped to persuade Senator Riegle,
(who was heir apparent to retiring Senate Banking Chairperson
Proxmire), to support a bill to re-capitalize the FSLIC. Gray attempted to
raise new resources for the FSLIC re-capitalization plan stalled in the
House by the opposition Majority Leader Jim Wright (Mayer; 1993, p.
198). Gray hoped to get enough money to pay off the brokered deposits
and close down the worst S&L disasters in Texas and California. The
Senate would have voted for major re-capitalization plan and demanded
that the House go along with the plan (Mayer; 1993, p. 1998).
However, Senator Riegle had other business in mind. At the end of
the meeting, he pulled Gray aside and asked if he would meet alone with
a group of Senators who were upset with the Bank Board's treatment of
Lincoln Savings' examination. Gray protested, but the antagonism of the
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Senators could be fatal to his plans. Gray felt that he could confront the
Senators. However, he needed their votes in the Senate to obtain new
funds for the failing FSLIC (Seidman; 1993, p. 233). Gray could not afford
to anger members of Congress when he wanted $15 billion for the re
capitalization plan (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 284). Thus, Senator
Riegle's persistence culminated in the famous meetings between Gray,
San Francisco regulators, and five Senators who became the "Keating
Five" (Day; 1993, p. 263).
On April 2, 1987, Gray arrived alone at the Senator Riegle's office,
and he was ill prepared to face the hostile audience. He was stunned to
see Senator Cranston, Senator Glenn, Senator DeConcini, and Senator
McCain without their staff, an unusual occurrence since Senators seldom
meet outsiders without aides present (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p.
290). Senator DeConcini complained about the examination of Lincoln
Savings and the equity rule.

"We're here on behalf of "our friend" at

Lincoln Savings and are concerned that a regulation that the Bank Board
adopted is unconstitutional" (Day; 1993, p. 263). "Our friend at Lincoln
Savings had relayed these concerns to us" (Adams; 1990, p. 244). "Look,
this is what we'll do. We agree with the idea that Lincoln Savings is not
making home loans is bad" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 290).
Therefore, Senator DeConcini offered a quid pro quo. "We assure you that
'our friend' will make more home loans and get into the basic business of
home lending if you do something. You have to withdraw the equity risk
regulation" (Jeffrey; 1990, p. 20).
Gray believed the idea of a quid pro quo was bizarre. He never had
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been asked until this meeting by any U.S. Senator to withdraw a
regulation for any reason, particularly on behalf of a "friend," especially,
in the privacy of a senatorial office (Adams; 1990, p. 244). Gray implied
that it would be improper to ask about specific negotiations with Lincoln
Savings or about any arrangement the Senators tried to promote for their
"friend" (Day; 1993, p. 264). Furthermore, Gray· offered his opinion that it
was highly irregular for him, as the Bank Board chairperson, to be asked
to discuss a savings and loan that was presently being examined by
regulators (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 366). He explained, "If
they had any more questions about Lincoln Savings, contact Jim Girona,
president of the Federal Home Loan Bank in San Francisco" (Pizzo,
Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 291).
On April 9, 1987, the Keating Five summoned the field regulator
officials from San Francisco to Washington, D.C.

Senator DeConcini

called Girona and asked if he and his staff would discuss "The Lincoln
Problem" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 291). Girona agreed. The
FHLB-SF personnel were Girona, president; Michael Patriarca, Director
of Agency Functions; and Richard Sanchez, Supervisory Agent for Lincoln
Savings.
Anne Sobol, a lawyer for the Bank Board, and Bill Black, FSLIC
Deputy Director, met the regulators. Sobol told Girona that she would
forward a criminal referral to the U.S. Department of Justice for
American Continental alleged "stuffing files" and falsifying documents on
direct investments uncovered in Lincoln Savings' 1986 audit (Einstein
and Bowden; 1993, p. 288). After the regulators planned their strategy,
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Black escorted the regulators to Senator DeConcini's office for the
confidential six o'clock meeting.
Present were Senator McCain, Senator Glenn, and Senator Riegle
(soon to be chairperson of the Senate Banking Committee).

Senator

Cranston arrived at Senator DeConcini's office, "I'm sorry I can't join you,
but I have to be on the floor to deal with a bill" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo;
1989, p. 394). "I just want to say that I share the concerns of the other
Senators on this subject" (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 289).

Each

Senator claimed their "friend" as his personal constituent. They stated
that Lincoln Savings location was in Irvine, California, American
Continental Corporation was a Cincinnati, Ohio-chartered Corporation,
and American Continental Corporation's headquarters was in Phoenix,
Arizona (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 290). Black took detailed
notes, which became an unofficial transcript of the meeting (Pizzo,
Fricker, and Muolo; 1981, p. 291).
Senator DeConcini started with a strong defense of Lincoln
Savings. "We wanted to meet with you because we have determined that
potential actions of yours could injure a constituent. This is of particular
concern to us because Lincoln Savings is willing to take substantial
actions to deal with what we understand to be your concerns. "Lincoln is
a viable organization. It made $49 million last year, even more the year
before" (Adams; 1990, p. 245). "Lincoln is prepared to go into a major
home loan program for 55 percent of its assets" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo;
1989, p. 291).
Senator DeConcini continued with Keating's complaints. "Lincoln
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Savings have two major disagreements with you. First, it is with regard
to direct investments.

Second, it is your reappraisal.

They are suing

against your direct investment regulation. We suggest that the lawsuit be
accelerated and you grant them forbearance while the suit is pending"

..

-.
(Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 292). "I know something about
the

appraisal values. They appear to be grossly unfair. I know the particular
property here [The Phoenician Hotel].

Lincoln Savings is prepared
to
•

reach a compromise value with you" (Mayer; 1993, p. 199).
Senator Glenn stated,
Ohio-chartered corporation.

"American Continental Corporation is an
I've known them for a long time, but it

wouldn't matter if I didn't" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 394).
"Why has the exam dragged on and on? Ordinary exams take maybe up
to six months" (Adams; 1990, p. 245).

"Even the Arthur Andersen
•

...

Accounting firm says you've taken an unusually adversarial view toward
Lincoln.

To be blunt, you should charge them or get off their backs"

(Mayer; 1993, p. 199).

"I'm not trying to get anyone off.

If there is

wrongdoing, I am on your side. But, I don't want any unfairness against a
viable entity" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 396).

,. is that this
Senator Riegle stated, "The appearance from a distance
thing is out of control and has become a struggle between Keating and
Gray, two people I gather who have never met. The appearance is that it
is a fight to the death.

This discredits everyone if it becomes the

perception" (Adams, 1990; Mayer, 1993).
problems at Lincoln, OK.

..

"If there are fundamental

I just want to make sure the regulators are

acting in a fair and professional manner" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo;
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1989, p. 396).
The regulators came to the meeting prepared with evidence that
the Bank Board should take Lincoln Savings away from American

..

Continental because it had become a rogue institution operating in an
unsafe and illegal matter.

Cirona put the Senators on notice.

"This

meeting is very unusual to discuss a particular company" (Pizzo, Fricker
and Muolo; 1989, p. 292).

Cirona took the offensive.

"We [the San

Francisco FHLB] determine how examinations are conducted. Gray never
gave me instructions on how to conduct this exam or any other exam. We
wanted Lincoln Savings in line with Gray's new direct-investment
regulation" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 292).
In addition, Cirona wanted Lincoln Savings to make more home
loans. "Lincoln Savings had been a heavy single-family mortgage lender.
.... _J

In 1983, residential loans had been more than 30 percent of Lincoln's

..

, Lincoln
·
assets" (Day; 1993, p. 209). However, in 1985 and early 1986,
Savings originated only eleven home loans. Four were for employees and
seven other on property owned by Lincoln Savings" (Day; 1993, p. 209).
Cirona claimed, "For a $3.6 billion savings institution with 24 branch
offices, it was unusual behavior" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 290).
Richard Sanchez presented the Bank Board's case on the factitious
appraisals or with no appraisal at all. Sanchez contended that Lincoln
Savings exaggerated the value of properties in which American
Continental had invested or made loans.

"Our 1984 examination [of

Lincoln] showed significant appraisal deficiencies. Mr. Keating promised
,. not corrected
to correct the problem. Our 1986 exam showed that he had
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the problems, and there were huge appraisal problems" (Pizzo, Fricker,
for the
and Muolo; 1989, p. 292). Sanchez cited one appraisal redone
•
FHLB-SF by Merrill Lynch. "We have independent appraisals. Merrill
Lynch appraised The Phoenician Hotel. It shows a significant loss" (Pizzo,
Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 292). "The Phoenician project lost over $100
million" (Lowy; 1991, p. 147). "These underwriting practices violate our
regulatory guidelines," (Adams; 1990, p. 246).
In addition, Sanchez told the Senators, "Lincoln had underwriting
problems with all their investments, equity securities, debt securities,
land loans, and direct real estate investments" (Pizzo, Fricker,
• and Muolo;

..

1989, p. 292). He said, "Out of 52 real estate loans Lincoln Savings made
between 1984 and 1986, there were no credit reports in the file• on the

... found $47
borrowers in all 52 cases" (Adams; 1993, p. 246). "Examiners

million in loans made to borrowers who did not have adequate credit to
assure repayment" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 293).

...
The Senators continued to advocate for Lincoln Savings.
Glenn
said, "Some people don't do the kind of underwriting you want." "Is their
•
judgment good"? Michael Patriarca responded, "That approach might be
okay if they were doing it with their money. They are not. They're using
federally insured deposits" (Adams; 1993, p. 246).
objected, "Where's the smoking gun?

Senator Riegle

"Where are the losses" (Adams;

1993, p. 246)? Senator DeConcini said, "What's wrong with this if they're
willing to clean up their act" (Adams; 1993, p. 246)? Cirona replied, "This
is a ticking time bomb" (Adams; 1993, p. 247).

'

However, the Keating Five continued to defend Lincoln Savings.

The following exchange between Senator Glenn and Patriarca altered the
entire tone of the meeting:
PATRIARCA:

They're flying blind on all their different
loans and
•
investments. I am relatively new to the savings and
loan industry, but I never have seen any bank or S&L
that is anything like this. This is not even close. You
can ask any banker you know about these practices.
They [Lincoln's practices] violate the law, regulations,
and common sense.

GLENN:

What violates the law?

PATRIARCA:

Their direct investments violate the regulation. Then
there is the file stuffing.
They took undated
documents purporting to show underwriting efforts
and put them into the files sometimes more than a
year after they made the investment.

GLENN:

Have you done anything about these violations of law?

PATRIARCA:

We are sending a criminal referral to the Department
of Justice. Not maybe, we are sending one. This is an
extraordinarily serious matter. It involves a whole
range of imprudent actions. I cannot tell you strongly
enough how serious this is. This is not a profitable
institution. Prior year adjustments will reduce that
reported $49 million profit. They did not earn $49
million. Let me give you one example. Lincoln
Savings sold a loan with recourse (i.e., the buyer could
sell it back at the same price at any time) and booked
a $12 million profit. The buyer rescinded the sale, but
Lincoln Savings left the $12 million profit on its books.

.

..

-.

DECONCINI:

Why do Lincoln's auditors continue to vouch for their
books? Do you believe they [private accounting firms]
would prostitute themselves for a client?

PATRIACRA:

Absolutely. It happens all the time.

RIEGLE:

Is this institution so far gone that it can't be salvaged?
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PATRIACRA:

I do not know. Lincoln Savings had $103 million in
goodwill (what a business says it customer's support is
worth) on their books. If this were backed out, they
would have been $78 million insolvent.

CIRONA:

The regulators had tried to compromise with Keating.
'
I never have seen such cantankerous behavior. At one
point, they said our examiners could not get any
association documents unless they made the request
through Lincoln's New York litigation counsel.

GLENN:

What can we say to Lincoln?

PATRIARCA:

I think my colleague Mr. Black put it right when he
said that it is as if these guys put it all on 16 black in
roulette. Maybe they will win. However, I can
guarantee you that if an institution continues such
behavior it will eventually go bankrupt.

DECONCINI:

Frankly, the criminality surprises me. I am sorry, but
I really do have to leave now (Pizzo, Fricker, and
Muolo; 1989, p. 294).

.

The meeting ended. The regulators left angry. Patriarca
stated,
•
"We spent six months inside Lincoln looking at the books, and these guys
were telling us there's nothing wrong" (Borger and Hedges; 1989, p. 21).
The Keating Five, counted American Continental amongst their biggest
political contributors, attempted to persuade regulators to look the other
way while American Continental continued to violate federal laws and
regulations at Lincoln Savings.

However, the regulators had strong

evidence of more than negligence, and deception; they had evidences of
illegal activity at Lincoln Savings.
On May 1, 1987, regulators completed their 285-page report of
Lincoln Savings (Lowy; 1991, p. 219).

They concluded, "Keating

recklessly and fraudulently ran Lincoln Savings into the ground, reaping
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$34 million for American Continental Corporation" (Rudnitsky; 1989, p.
140). They considered Lincoln Savings to be the biggest scandal of all
time (Adams; 1993, p. 248). Regulators compiled evidence of substantial
irregularities to justify seizing Lincoln Savings. The FHLB-SF Eleventh
District's examination stated:
(1) Lincoln Savings never made a profit except by trading
bad loans and securities.
(2) The trading profits were bleeding Lincoln's future ability
to make money.
(3) Sixty-two percent of Lincoln's assets were risky
investments in vacant land, hotels, ADC loans, junk
bonds, and equity securities.
(5) Lincoln Savings had enormous interest rate risk as well
as credit risk.
(6) Lincoln Savings made loans that were too large for its
size and capital position.
(7) Lincoln Savings violated the direct investment regulation
by at least $600 million and was still at it.
(8) Lincoln's management had violated representation after
representation to the Bank Board and therefore could not
be trusted.
(9) Lincoln's filed reports consistently overstated its income
(Lowy; 1991, p. 219).
Furthermore, regulators alleged that American Continental used a
network of subsidiaries to mask debt and avoid the equity rule to make
Lincoln Savings appear profitable (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 56).
However, the regulators failed to seize Lincoln Savings from American
Continental.

Instead, they suggested two recommendations. The first
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plan would place Lincoln Savings in conservatorship.

Even though

•
Lincoln Savings was insolvent, a conservatorship continues to make
loans

and take short-term deposits in attempt to make Lincoln Savings
I
lucrative. The second plan would place Lincoln Savings in receivership.

Receivership was the S&L's version of bankruptcy proceedings.
'.

The

receivership would close Lincoln Savings and pay off stockholders
(Pepinsky and Jesilow; 1992, p. 73).
Meanwhile, Keating kept channeling federally insured funds from
• I

•

..

Lincoln Savings into American Continental (Taylor; 1988, p. 38). He

·-

·"' ..... _.
boosted Lincoln's capital by selling junk bonds that masqueraded
as

federally insured certificates of deposit (Adams, 1990; Day, 1993). An
advertisement appeared in the Los Angeles Times touting an investment
opportunity (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 66). Lincoln Savings offered
American Continental's high-yield junk bonds. The bonds sold in $1,000
denominations and paid higher interest than federally insured certificates
•
of deposit (Mayer; 1993, p. 167). American Continental paid 9.5 percent
to 12 percent on a minimum investment of $2,000 for five years compared
to banks' certificates of deposit that average 7.8 percent for one year and
8.3 percent for five years (Taylor; 1988, p. 38).
Keating told Lincoln's employees to use sophistry to persuade
members to move their money from federally insured accounts to buy
American Continental's junk bonds (Seidman; 1993, p. 235). The selling
technique was bait-and-switch. Member Ramona E. Miller-Jacobs was a
victim of the bait-and-switch.

She went to the Burbank, California,
•

,\
11
branch of Lincoln Savings, looking for a safe place to put her
daughter's
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$11,000 (Dwyer; 1989, p. 26).

The money was part of an insurance

settlement from an accident that had left her daughter paralyzed. Miller
Jacobs said, "An employee at Lincoln Savings pressured her to put the
money into the unsecured high-yield junk bonds instead of her federally
insured account " (Dwyer, 1989; Giltenan, 1991). The employees never
mentioned that the federal government did not insure her funds.
The employees used the bait-and-switch strictly to deceive
investors. Many Lincoln's members believed that since Lincoln Savings
sold the bond, they thought the government backed the bonds with full
faith and credit (Coleman; 1994, p. 30). As a result, Lincoln's personnel
illegally sold $250 million of unsecured junk bonds to 23,000 unsuspecting
investors, mostly Senior citizens living on fixed income (Cope and Talley;
1994, p. 1). Regulators pledged to pursue whether American Continental
defrauded Lincoln's investors (Cope and Talley; 1994, p. 1).
At the same time, Keating sensed that the federal regulators were
very near to take control of Lincoln Savings. If the federal government
seized Lincoln Savings, American Continental would declare Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. This would build a legal wall between American
Continental's assets and the federal government. However, if American
Continental goes bankrupt, it would default on the $250 million of junk
bonds owned by 23,000 Lincoln's investors (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p.
350).
On April 13, 1989, Keating filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
for his entire $7 billion Corporation (Sloan and Taylor; 1988, p. 35). By
law, Lincoln Savings could not claim the Chapter 11 protection (Mayer;
-·
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1993, p. 287). However, Lincoln's corporate subsidiaries failed under the
bankruptcy protection. Therefore, in a last maneuver, Keating took $400
million in assets out of Lincoln Savings and sheltered them in eleven of
American Continental's subsidiaries (Adams; 1990, p. 252). Keating's key
purpose for placing American Continental in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
protection was to keep The Phoenician Hotel out of the federal
government's hands (Day; 1993, p. 343).

However, the junk bonds

defaulted and twenty-three thousands investors became victims of the
Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal (Borger and Hedges; 1989, p. 24).

On April 14, 1989, the FSLIC declared Lincoln Savings insolvent,
and placed it in conservatorship [ward of the federal government] (Rom;
1996, p. 243). Cirona and his staff presented to Bank Board officials in
Washington, D.C., the first government document of the scandal
specifying Lincoln Savings' estimated loss of $3.9 billion of federally
insured funds (Yancey; 1990, p. El).

Thus, American Continental's

bankruptcy became the subject of a criminal investigation.
Regulators investigated whether American Continental used
fraudulent activities in Lincoln Savings' direct investments and if
American Continental defrauded investors by concealing information
about the unsecured junk bonds. Cirona filed a criminal referral that
alleged Keating of using sophistry, machinations, and fraudulent
activities to obtain federally insured funds from Lincoln Savings to
maximize American Continental Corporation's profits (Rudnitsky; 1989, p.
140). Cirona forwarded the referral to the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS), and the U.S. Department of Justice for further investigation.
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The FDIC begins Criminal Probe of American Continental Corporation

Congress abolished the FSLIC and transferred its responsibilities

...

to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FDIC hired
Morrison & Hecker Law firm to investigate the regulators' allegations of
criminal activity between American Continental and the $3.9 billion
I
collapse of Lincoln Savings (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 6). Michael

Manning, an attorney for Morrison & Hecker, specialized in bank fraud,
uncovered the biggest criminal bank fraud in U.S. history done by
American Continental (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 8).

Manning

uncovered evidence on insider deals, shredding of Lincoln's files,
accounting gimmickry in Lincoln's books, and the looting of Lincoln
Savings.
Manning filed a 168-page Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organization (RICO) complaint seeking the return of $1.25 billion from
American Continental Corporation (Day; 1993, p. 343).

RICO charged

that American Continental had stolen $1.1 billion dollars of federally
insured

funds from Lincoln Savings through several fraudulent

investments (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 365).
American Continental's criminal activities included (1) expenditure
over $10 million on a project in dying downtown Detroit to finance the
Hotel Pontchartrain; (2) it recorded billions of dollars in risky investments
that were false profits; (3) a transaction that involved a $30 million loan
to a home-building company owned by R. A. Ober, Senator DeConcini's
campaign manager in 1988; (4) Keating and American Continental's
employees paid themselves $34 million in salaries, bonuses, and stock
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options; (5) Keating spent more than $35 million on the care of American
Continental's pilots and aircraft; and (6) Keating owned residences worth
more than $7 million and a retreat in the Bahamas (Einstein and
Bowden; 1993, p. 366).
On August 9, 1989, the OTS closed Lincoln Savings.

Kenneth

Leventhal & Company's accountants analyzed ·15 of Lincoln's real estate
deals and concluded that they were fraudulent transactions using
"accounting gimmickry" to produce spurious profits (Lowy; 1991, p. 150).
These deals created $135 million in paper profits since American
Continental acquired Lincoln Savings (Adams; 1990, p. 252). The report
concluded:
Seldom in our experience as accountants have we
encountered a more egregious example of the misapplication
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
This
association was made to function as an engine designed to
funnel insured deposits to American Continental in tax
allocation payments and dividends. To do this, it had to
generate reported earnings.
It generated earnings by
making loans or other transfers of cash or property to
facilitate sham sales of land. It created profits by making
loans. Many of the loans were bad. Lincoln Savings was
manufacturing profits by giving its money away (Adams,
1990; Rom, 1996).

...

The OTS estimated it would cost American taxpayers at least $2.5
billion to liquidate Lincoln Savings, not counting the $400 million in
assets that American Continental transferred the night before the federal
regulators seized Lincoln Savings (Rosenblatt; 1992, p. Al). OTS ranked
the scandal as the highest in the history of the FDIC (Adams; 1990, p.
253).
How did the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal come about? What
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were the acts of omission on the part of governmental agencies that
helped make it possible? Was the lack of the Bank Board's effort to follow
up on Lincoln Savings' direct investments resulted in seriously
inadequate enforcement in the industry? Why did the Bank Board under
Ed Gray take no action in a reasonable time about Lincoln Savings' risky
investments? Why did the Bank Board under Danny Wall fail to take
action against Lincoln Savings? Finally, why did the regulators failed to
seize Lincoln Savings from American Continental when it had strong
evidences of criminal activities occurring at Lincoln Savings?
Omission by the Federal Government

Two federal agencies failed in several ways. First, the Bank Board
was statutorily responsible for insuring the safe practice of services
provided by federal and state-chartered S&Ls. The Bank Board under
two chairmanships had known for some time about the regulatory
violations at Lincoln Savings. Yet, both Bank Boards took no effective
effort to remedy the situation except to shift the responsibility and delay
the closing of Lincoln Savings. Second, the FHLB-SF regulators, who had
the authority to seize Lincoln Savings, failed to take action. Instead, they
made two recommendations to the Bank Board to allowed Lincoln Savings
to remain open.

Therefore, the regulators' recommendations allowed

Lincoln Savings to remain in American Continental's possession to
continue its criminal activity.
On June 22, 1987, the regulators' recommendations arrived on the
desk of Shannon Fairbanks, Gray's chief of staff. The closing of Lincoln
Savings was not high on Gray's "To Do" list (Adams; 1990, p. 248). He

had good reason to let the issue ride. A provision of the Garn-St Germain
Act that authorized the Bank Board to close state-chartered S&Ls had

,.
expired (Day; 1993, p. 265). The only available sanction was to rescind
• it
Lincoln's deposit insurance. However, Gray's staff warned him that

might appear that he was trying to get Keating in a last gasp act of
revenge.

They told him that this might somehow give credence to

Keating's allegations that he had a vendetta against Keating (Adams;
1990, p. 248).
Furthermore, board member Lawrence White made it very clear to
Gray. "He did not want to take up major matters until after the new
board under Melvin Danny Wall took office" (Adams; 1990, p. 249).
Therefore, Gray failed to take any action against Lincoln Savings. He
ended his four-year term as Chairperson of the Bank Board and left the
regulators' recommendations to his successor Melvin Danny Wall.
On July 1, 1987, Danny Wall became chairperson of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board. Wall was no stranger to politics or the Senate,
where he was the staff director of the Senate Banking Committee. He
spent eleven years as an aide to Senator Garn (Borger and Hedges; 1989,
p. 21). Also, Wall helped shape much of the Garn-St. Germain Act when
he was on the Banking Committee's staff. Under the new Bank Board,
Wall's immediate job was to close Lincoln Savings (Adams; 1990, p. 249).
On August 10, 1987, Wall received the recommendation to close
Lincoln Savings (Lowy; 1991, p. 220). Wall and his aides sifted through
material that contained information that would have been enough for the

..

Bank Board to take enforcement action against Lincoln Savings.
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•
However, they overlooked the evidence needed to close Lincoln Savings.
The regulators' findings did not convince Wall to close Lincoln Savings.
.;,
Instead, Wall and his top aide enforcement, Darrel Dochow, decided that

because the battle between Gray and Keating evolved into a personal
fight and the facts were difficult to sort out. Both agreed that the Bank
• I
Board did not have a solid case against Lincoln Savings (Day; 1993,
p.

338).

Wall decided that he wanted to mend relations with Keating.

Therefore, Dochow rescinded the criminal referral mentioned by the

•· 1990, p. 250).
regulators, and they wanted to meet with Keating (Adams;
On September 2, 1987, Wall and Dochow met with Keating at the
Bank Board's headquarters to defuse the heated controversy (Seidman;
1993, p. 188). Keating complained that he was "frustrated
by this exam
•

..

that was ongoing" (Borger and Hedges; 1989, p. 24). "The zealots at the
Federal Home Loan Bank in San Francisco were out to get him because
he had fought Gray's direct investment regulation" (Lowy; 1991, p. 220).
In November 1987, the Bank Board's Office of Regulatory Activities
informed Wall that Lincoln Savings, "Currently presents an excessive risk
to the industry and is operating in an unsafe and unsound manner" (Day;
1993, p. 342). Wall assigned Dochow to oversee a complete reevaluation
•
and deferred Lincoln's closing (Seidman; 1993, p. 188). Dochow asked two
top staff members to do the review, Assistant Director for Regional
Operations, Al Smuzynski and Kevin O'Connell (Day; 1993, p. 339). Thus,
Smuzynski conducted the review.
In December 1987, Smuzynski sent a memo to Dochow stating that
the regulators had been right in their findings.

"I recommend that the
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He decided

that regulators might have been correct in their fact-finding, but they

339). Dochow did not accept Smuzynski's recommendation.

other measures to restructure the organization of the thrift" (Day; 1993, p.

addressed the unsafe and unsound practices at Lincoln Savings and take

Bank Board proceed with a consent cease and desist order, which

..

were not necessarily correct concluding that Lincoln Savings should be

I

•

order was necessary. He felt that "Lincoln's future need not be as bleak or

closed. In addition, Dochow did not agree that a consent cease and desist

,I

t

hopeless as viewed by the San Francisco Bank" (Day; 1993, p. 339). He

i,

.

I

•

but did not act, was the Enforcement Review Committee (the Committee).

The second agency that could have acted to close Lincoln Savings,

Savings' dispute (Day; 1993, p. 339).

concurred with Wall's desire to seek a "peaceful resolution" to the Lincoln

1'

I

,!

.

C

•

'

I

On December 23, 1987, Danny Wall announced the creation of the

•
-

-

.

;

"Enforcement Review Committee" to evaluate all recommendations and

A

.

(

)

I

.

I

l
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.
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.

..

emphasizes the importance of prompt and effective enforcement actions

It

..
.

this committee is another significant step taken by the Bank Board.

He stated, "The creation of

enforcement action against all federally and state chartered S&Ls such as

4..

Lincoln Savings' case (Mayer; 1993, p. 21).

.

.

I

committee consisted of people close to Wall were Dochow, Top aid; Jordan

However, the

against institutions that are unwilling or unable to comply with statutory

f

and regulatory requirements" (Day; 1993, p. 339).
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..
•

Luke, the Bank Board Chief Counsel; George Barclay, President of the

.

•. .

Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas; Rosemary Stewart, Director of

l

..

Enforcement; and Karl Hoyle, Communications Director, who functioned

,

r
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as a political adviser to Wall.
The Committee suggested that the Bank Board transfer the
oversight of Lincoln Savings from the San Francisco field office to the
Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle.

However, Officials in Seattle

opposed the idea. After reviewing Lincoln Savings' record, Seattle officials
recognized that such a transfer would be unprecedented to allow S&Ls to
shop for the regulator they liked best (Day; 1993, p. 339).
Meanwhile, the Committee held 23 hours of hearings to review the
evidence against Lincoln Savings from February 1988 to May 1988
(Mayer; 1993, p. 213). The Bank Board and the Committee met at the
Bank Board headquarters for a meeting. During the meeting, most of the
discussion centered on whether or not Lincoln Savings should have the
right to change supervisors.
In a curious report, the Committee deplored the "seriously
adversarial relationship" between Lincoln Savings and the FHLB-SF
regulators (Adams; 1990, p. 250).

Dochow presented the Committee's

conclusions to the Bank Board. Dochow wrote: "First, Lincoln Savings is
not insolvent now and will not necessarily be insolvent in the future.
Second, there are many significant disagreements among experienced,
competent, and thoughtful individuals about the soundness and risks
involved in Lincoln's operations. Third, Lincoln Savings and the Agency
Functions Group at the San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank have a
seriously adversarial relationship that prevents normal supervisory
communications. Finally, there have been repeated leaks of confidential
Bank Board's information that have damaged Lincoln's reputation"
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(Mayer; 1993, p. 211).
Members of the Committee agreed to transfer Lincoln Savings'
regulatory responsibilities to the Bank Board in Washington, D.C.
However, board member White, the only Democrat, expressed his concern
about the appearance of such a transfer before the Bank Board cast their
votes. The notion that an S&L could "shop for a regulator is a very, very
serious problem" (Day; 1993, p. 340). Yet, Wall and new member Roger
Martin remained unconvinced and cast their votes.

The Bank Board

voted 2-1 to take supervision of Lincoln Savings away from the San
Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank and transfer it to the Bank Board's
headquarters (Pepinsky and Jesilow; 1991, p. 73). Thus, Wall made the
unprecedented decision to remove the regulatory supervision of Lincoln
Savings from San Francisco to Washington, D.C. (Pizzo, Fricker, and
Muolo; 1989, p. 295).
..

The decision to transfer the superv1s1on of Lincoln Savings
humiliated the regulators in San Francisco. Cirona complained, "Wall's
action crippled the independence of his examination staff and undercut
every regulator in the country" (Pizzo, Fricker, and Muolo; 1989, p. 295).
"It undermines the integrity and the perception of the integrity of the
supervisory process" (Day; 1993, p. 341). "It will encourage [banks and
S&Ls] to say, 'Let's make big contributions to politicians and maybe if we
do, we can buy our way out of the grasp of a tough regulator"' (Day; 1993,
p. 341).
Meanwhile, Wall and Enforcement Director Rosemary Stewart
negotiated a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU).

This MOU
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terminated (1) Lincoln Savings' action against the Bank Board; (2)
removed Lincoln Savings from the San Francisco's jurisdiction; (3)
provided a new examination by Washington, D.C. Bank Board personnel;
(5) required American Continental to put $10 million of new capital into
Lincoln Savings; (6) required Lincoln Savings to improve its underwriting
and record keeping; (7) restricted several categories of investments; and
(8) the Bank Board would not seek a criminal prosecution against
American Continental (Lowy; 1991, p. 221).
The MOU amounted to the Bank Board giving Lincoln's operation a
clean bill of health during the new examination. It was a document that
many federal officials thought was so lenient that the San Francisco
regulators dubbed it "Rosemary's baby" (Borger and Hedges, 1989; Day,
1993). Stewart defended the MOU, arguing that it "in no way bound the
agency or restricted us for taking action" (Borger and Hedges; 1989, p.
245).
In addition, Wall assembled a new team of examiners from the
Home Loan Banks' staffs around the country and placed them under the
direct control of Dochow.

Dochow forbid examiners to read Lincoln's

original documents. He supplied them with copies (Davis; 1997, p. 33).
The examiners finished its examination of Lincoln Savings.

The

examiners' audit uncovered evidence of assets moved from Lincoln
Savings to American Continental. They accused American Continental of
"cooking the books" to make itself and Lincoln Savings appeared healthy
(Day; 1993, p. 341).
Furthermore, exammers contended that American Continental
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made deals with insiders and affiliated compames that cost Lincoln
Savings more than $100 million between 1986 and 1988 (Pizzo, Fricker,
and Muolo; 1989, p. 295). The deals allowed subsidiaries to advance cash
to American Continental to cover tax liabilities. The plan was one more
device to benefit American Continental at the expense of Lincoln Savings"
(Long; 1993, p. 39).

Therefore, examiners demanded that American

Continental relinquish control of Lincoln Savings immediately (Rom;
1996, P. 243).
Although the Keating Five did not have regulatory control over
Lincoln Savings, their political influence allowed Lincoln Savings to
remain in American Continental's possession.

American Continental's

massive political contributions ensured that the Keating Five would
handle Keating's problems at the highest levels. When a reporter asked
whether his large political campaign contributions assured him influence
over the Keating Five, Keating replied, "I want to say in the most forceful
way I can. I certainly hope so" (Adams, 1990; day, 1993; Rom, 1996).
Senator DeConcini admitted as much. He stated, he knew going to
bat for a big donor might raise questions. "I knew I had to have some
justification to satisfy myself precisely because this guy is a big
contributor. In retrospect, I made a mistake" (Borger and Hedges; 1989,
p. 24).

However, the Keating Five maintain it was another version of

constituent service. They claimed that Keating was a constituent (Smart;
1989, p. 60).

Yet, the intervention of the Keating Five protracted the

regulatory examination process and afforded American continental
additional time in which to exacerbate its criminal fraud.
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Judge Stanley Sporkin took the opportunity to speak out against
the role of private-sector professionals during a $1.1 billion civil lawsuit
trial filed by the OTS. He stated, "What has emerged is not a pretty
picture.

It is abundantly clear that American Continental's officials

abused their positions with respect to Lincoln Savings. Bluntly speaking,
their actions amounted to looting Lincoln Savings. Indeed, it was done
with a great deal of sophistication. The transactions were all made to
have an aura of legality about them" (Rom; 1996, p. 244). He described
Keating's treatment of Lincoln Savings as an analogous to "an adult
taking candy from a helpless child" (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 383).
Further, Judge Sporkin noted that Lincoln Savings symbolized the
breakdown of private-sector safeguards who failed to detect the
apparently wide spread abuses that led to the scandal. "What is difficult
to understand is that with all the professional talent involved, legal
profession and accounting profession, why at least one professional would
not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that took place in this
case"(Binstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 383)? "Why didn't any of them speak
up or disassociate themselves from these transactions? Where were these
professionals when these clearly improper transactions were being
consummated" (Day; 1993, p. 350)? Specifically, Danny Wall's unusual

...

decision to switch regulation of Lincoln Savings from San Francisco to
Washington, D.C. as "inexplicable and clearly inappropriate" (Day; 1993,
p. 349).
Representative Henry Gonzalez, Chairperson of House Banking
Committee, commented when the government seized Lincoln Savings,
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"The Lincoln case 1s exhibit number one m the failures and
mismanagement of the Bank Board under Danny Wall. The Bank Board
had known from the day that Danny Wall took office that Lincoln Savings
was sick. It took no action. In fact, its only action was to block regulatory
moves by the San Francisco Federal Home Loan Bank. It is one of the
saddest cases in a long, long list of regulatory disasters. Danny Wall's
political decision and outright sabotage of regulatory actions will cost
American taxpayers approximately $3 billion" (Calavita, Pontell, and
Tillman; 1997, p. 27).
The failure of California State Government

The operations of the state government agency played its role in
contributing to the scandal. California State Regulatory Commission is
responsible for all state-chartered S&Ls. California State regulators were
responsible for the regulatory examination and supervision of Lincoln
Savings. The state regulators must comply with all federal regulations.
However, California State Regulator Lawrence Taggart did not comply
with federal regulations. He approved the change of control for Lincoln
Savings to American Continental without checking the SEC before
approving the sell of Lincoln Savings. If he would have checked with the
SEC, he should have denied the sell because of Keating's 1979 run-in with
the SEC (Jeffrey; 1990, p. 18). This factor suggests that the California
State Regulatory Commission did not take the issue of Keating's SEC
record seriously enough to insure that it would protect Lincoln Savings
and Lincoln's members from criminals like Keating.
In the end, the bankruptcy protection did not protect American

Continental and Keating from criminal indictments related to the Lincoln
Savings & Loan Scandal.

Keating came under scrutiny by state and

federal prosecutors as part of the investigation into the Lincoln debacle.
State and federal prosecutors had acknowledged that American
Continental had defrauded investors and committed a host of securities
fraud since the take over of Lincoln Savings in 1984.
California State Authorities Indicate Charles H. Keating Jr. for Fraud

On September 19, 1990, California authorities arrested Charles H.
Keating Jr. and booked him into the Los Angeles Country Jail.

A

California Grand Jury indicted him on forty-two counts of criminal fraud
(Farnham, 1990; Greenwald, 1990). State authorities accused Keating of
defrauding Lincoln Savings' members out of $250 million of worthless
junk bonds (Day; 1993, p. 392).
The lead headline of the Los Angeles Times announced in bold
print, "KEATING INDICTED FOR FRAUD, JAILED" (Granelli; 1990,
p. Al). Keating's police "mug shot" dressed in jailhouse blue appeared on
the front pages of newspapers and news broadcasts across the country.
"Keating trades his business suit for prison blues" (Stolberg; 1990, p. Al).
He could face up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine if he found
guilty (Kerwin; 1991, p. 36).
Los Angeles District Attorney Ira Reiner stated, "Keating's photo
should be hung in every boardroom in America to warn executives not to
be like him (Einstein and Bowden, 1993; day, 1993).

It was quite a

turnabout for a man who at the height of his power in the roarmg
eighties, commanded an estimated $100 million corporation fortune,
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controlled $1 billion in financial assets, and counted five U.S. Senators
among his powerful buddies (Magnuson; 1990, p. 43).
In September 1991, Keating's trial started in Los Angeles Superior
Court for criminal fraud. The jury heard two months of testimony that
argued on a narrow part of the complex charges against Keating in
connection with the junk bond sales.

The trial focused on whether

Keating and American Continental Corporation defrauded 18 of the
23,000 investors.

Los Angeles District Attorney William Hodgman

[prosecutor in the O.J. Simpson's murder trial] pinned the state's case on

..

....., federal
proving that Keating failed to disclose to investors that the
government did not insure the junk bonds (Kerwin; 1991, p. 36).
District Attorney Hodgman contended that the mosaic pieced
together from the evidence of more than 50 witnesses who testified that

.,.
Keating was in charge at Lincoln Savings for the junk bond sale program
that beguiled na:ive investors.

..

<
,Former Lincoln Savings' employees

testified of trips to Phoenix, where Keating exhorted them to sell more
junk bonds (Kerwin; 1991, p. 36).

Several senior citizens investors

;:.
testified that representatives at Lincoln's branch offices persuaded them

to cash out their federally insured certificates of deposit and buy
American Continental's junk bonds.

Yet, the strongest prosecution

testimony came from former Lincoln Savings President Ray C. Fidel, who
pleaded guilty to six counts of fraud. Fidel testified, "He told Keating that
federal regulators insisted on moving the bond sales out of Lincoln
branches." Keating replied, "Can't we cheat" (Kerwin; 1991, p. 36)?
Keating's defense lawyer, Stephen C. Neal, believed
that state
•
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prosecutors could never link Keating with any false presentation of junk
bonds to 18 investors. Keating's defense was that he was not directly
involved in the bond sales, and he relied on advice from lawyers and
accountants about the bonds. Neal used his cross-examination to elicit
testimony favorable to Keating from some prosecution witnesses.
However, Neal surprised courtroom observers by resting his case without
calling any defense witnesses.

He said, "The prosecution hasn't come

close to proving that Keating knowingly and intentionally defrauded 18
investors named in the case" (Kerwin; 1991, p. 36).
On December 4, 1991, Los Angeles Superior Court jury convicted
Keating on 17 of 18 counts of securities fraud for aiding and abetting
in
•
the fraudulent sale of American Continental's junk bonds (Granelli and
Bates, 1991; Furlong, 1991).

Keating faced sentencing before Judge

Lance Ito. He addressed the bench, "I'm not a swindler as charged and
convicted, but a man who made quality investments and never bilked the
bondholders who loaned me a quarter of a billion dollars, money that is all
gone as I speak this day. Some day I hope, I will be able to tell that story
in full" (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 33).
However, Keating's speech did not sway Judge Ito. Judge Ito noted
that American Continental's representatives wore t-shirts that read,
"Bond for Glory." He pointed out that Songwriter Woody Guthrie thought
that more money was stolen with a fountain pen than with a sword
(Celano; 1992, p. 33). Thus, Judge Ito sentenced Keating to 10 years in
prison for his role in the sale of junk bonds to Lincoln's investors
(Coleman; 1994, p. 30). Furthermore, Judge Ito ordered Keating to pay a
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fine of $250,000 (Einstein and Bowden; 1993, p. 404). However, Keating's
problems did not stop there.

He faced a federal grand-jury probe of

securities violations.
Federal Authorities Indicate Charles H. Keating Jr. for Fraud

In December 1991, the federal authority indicted Keating on 73
counts of securities fraud (Collingwood, 1991; Kerwin, 1991; Sandler,
1991).

The indictment alleged that American Continental and Arthur

Andersen employees (1) gave false financial information to obtain a loan;
(2) knowingly kept false records and books; (3) knowingly provided false
information to regulators; and (4) breached the fiduciary duty to the
institution (Calavita, Pontell, and Tillman; 1997, p. 20).
In October 1992, Keating's federal trial began m Los Angeles,
California.

Former American Continental President, Judy Wischer,

became a key witness for the government. She supplied one key element
in the case. She testified under oath, "Lincoln's employees motivation for
preparing the summaries in March 1986 was to get information in the
files that clarified and improved the files because without the summaries,
something was missing" (Mayer; 1993, p. 192). She affirmed, "Examiners'
imminent arrival at Lincoln Savings was an important factor in Keating's
decision to prepare the summaries" (Mayer; 1993, p. 192).
On January 6, 1993, the federal grand jury delivered its verdict
against Keating. The jury convicted Keating on 73 counts of racketeering,
fraud, and conspiracy (Day; 1993, p. 392). Thus, Judge Mariana Pfaelzer
sentenced Keating to 12 years in prison, fined him $17 million, and
ordered him to forfeited $265 million in assets (Einstein and Bowden,
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1993; Celano, 1993; Day, 1993). Keating's sentences were among the
stiffest for crimes related to fraudulent activity at S&Ls (Rhoads; 1995, p.
8).

.. released
However, on October 3, 1996, U.S. District Judge Pfaelzer

.

A
- "
Keating from prison on bail after serving 4 1/2 years of a 12-year sentence

on his state convictions and about 7 years left on his federal sentence
(Davis; 1997, p. 28). Keating's lawyers obtained statements from several
...
jurors and alternates after Keating's federal convictions. The statements

.. knew about Keating's
indicated that at least some jurors on the panel
state conviction. Judge Pfaelzer had ruled before the trial that evidence.. of
Keating's state convictions could not be admissible (Reckard, 1996;
Zagorin, 1997). She believed that jurors would be more inclined to convict
Keating if they knew that a state jury had found him guilty on similar
allegations (Davis; 1997, p. 28).

. ' ..
On December 3, 1996, Judge Pfaelzer overturned Keating's
1993•
federal conviction for fraud (Greenwald; 1996, p. 56). She ruled that the
,,.
jury improperly concealed knowledge of his 1991-California state

conviction on similar charges (Morris, 1996; Celano, Sanders, and Liaison,
1996). Judge Pfaelzer stated, "Jurors had discussed the state conviction
- ..
in the jury room. Therefore, the information denied Keating a fair trial"
(White; 1999, p. 1). The federal government appealed Judge Pfaelzer's
ruling.
On June 9, 1998, the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a
1996 decision by U.S. District Judge Pfaelzer to overturn Charles
Keating's federal convictions. The Court's 3-0 ruling upheld that Keating
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was entitled to a new trial on federal securities charges because jurors
improperly learned of state convictions on similar charges. Assistant U.S.
Attorney Bard Sonnenberg told Judge Pfaelzer that the government
intended to retry Keating again on charges that would re-examine the
Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal.
Meanwhile, Neal said that he would appeal to authorities for a
"sense of fairness and sense of order" to let Keating remain free until his
appeal is resolved. "The man has spent almost five years in prison on
convictions that have major flaws. He is 7 4 years old. He's never going to
run anywhere" (Davis; 1997, p. 30). Thus, Keating is confident that the
court will exonerate him from any remaining legal issues (Davis; 1997, p.
30). As of January 2002, federal authorities have not retried Keating.
The likelihood of any criminal retrial arising from the Lincoln Savings &
Loan Scandal has diminished because the statute of limitations had
expired (Rhoads; 1995, p. 8).
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CHAPTER 5
THEORETICAL INTERPRETATION
One form of state-corporate crime focuses on the direct role of the
state in initiating a cooperative activity involving both government and a
private business that can lead to a deviant outcome. The second form of
state-corporate crime suggests a different kind of relationship.

This

relationship is where government omissions permit corporations to pursue
illegal and potentially harmful courses of action. It is where the state
facilitates the criminal behavior of the corporation. It is one of the least
recognizable forms of state involvement in crime. Clearly, the Lincoln
Savings & Loan Scandal was a case of state facilitated state-corporate
crime, which identified specific actions by governmental agencies that led

to identifiable social harms.
The data show that state-corporate crimes like the Lincoln Savings
& Loan case are a serious social problem that penetrates all aspects of life
and undermines relations of trust and principles on the foundation of
American institutions. The physical and economic toll for individuals and
for society as a whole from these crime are staggering. Given the extent
of state-corporate crime, it is crucial to understand its causes.

What

motivates the corporate criminal? What conditions and circumstance are
associated with state-corporate misconduct? This chapter will review the
theories of organizational crime.
Theories of Organizational Crime
Social-Psychological Explanations
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Social-psychological theories state that crime lies within the
individual.

They view criminals, especially street criminals, as

psychiatrically disordered or psychopathic.

Corporate criminals, rather

than being seen as deranged, are suspected of being egocentric, morally
flexible, overly ambitious, and prone to risks (Simpson; 1993, p. 243).
However, criminologists should not dismiss the social-psychological
perspective because it is possible that personality characteristics lead to
crime (Simpson, 1993). For instance, a manager who is overly concerned
with pleasing others might be vulnerable to peer or supervisor pressure to
violate the law.
The social-psychological level of analysis exammes individuals
within a group context. This micro approach is Sutherland's differential
association theory. Differential association theory was one of the first
theories applied to white-collar crime, which addressed the individual
level of action. Differential association meant to explain both the process
by which a given person learns to engage in crime and the content of what
is learned.
Differential association holds that individuals learn criminal
behavior like any other behavior, and this process of learning takes places
primarily in intimate, personal groups and in isolation from those who
define such behavior unfavorably (Sutherland, 1940; 1949). The more an
individual associates with those with favorable attitudes toward crime,
the more likely an individual will engage in behavior if the weight of the
favorable definitions exceeds the weight of the unfavorable definitions.
Applying these principles to white-collar crime, Sutherland vigorously
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rejected any notion that immorality, physical make-up, or psychological
characteristics of the criminals caused white-collar crime.

Individuals

become white-collar criminals because they learn to act that way, often
from their associates on the job (Sutherland, 1949).

..

However, social-psychological theories do not provide a clear picture
of why organizations violate the law.

Their failure to incorporate the

organizational and structural levels of analysis is a major weakness. Its
present offenders as a few bad apples and ignores the nature of
organizations as social actors.

Theories that focus only on social
•

...

.
psychological variables cannot adequately explain why organizations
as
social actors violate the law. Why do some organizations violate the law
while other organizations do not?

Why are some organizations

criminogenic at one time and not criminogenic at others?

The

organization is the key to understanding how criminal
• motivations,
pressure to commit crimes, and criminal opportunities emerge.

Thus,

macro sociological rather than individual levels of explanation
is
•
necessary to explain organizational crimes.
Organizational Explanations

Organizational theorists argue that the organization itself should

....
•
be central to the analysis of organizational crime (Clinard
and Yeager,
1980; Ermann and Lundman, 1978; Finney and Lesieur, 1982; Gross,
1978; 1980; Kramer, 1982; Scrager and Short, 1978; Vaughan, 1982;
1983). Among the features of organizations that are criminogenic, both
culture and structure warrant discussion. Organizational culture refers to
the shared language, symbols, rituals, and belief of an organization and
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its members. Organizational structure refers to the design of a company,
what form it assumes, its authority structures, its lines of communication,
etc (Simpson; 1993, p. 244). Corporations are
that seek two
•
• organizations
primary goals: (1) profit and (2) expansion of market share. These goals
_...
permeate the various subunits of the
organization
(such as sales and
•

...

marketing, finance, and productions), and flow across organizational
positions.

What people do in corporations and how they are evaluated

.. .. come to identify with
reflect these organizational goals? Thus, individuals

the corporation and its goals.
The focus on goals is the central characteristic of organizations and
therefore, of organizational crime; organizations are evaluated in terms of
their successes or failures in the attainment of goals. For an organization
to be successful, each organization must have an internal social structure
designed to achieve its goals, consisting of internal processes and
hierarchical series of positions or status relationships.

Organizations

p
vary in the ways in which their social structures
" systematically and

continuously generate unlawful organizational behavior. Of considerable
importance is the fact that some internal social structures and processes
"often tend to produce tensions for organizations to obtain goal
unlawfully" (Vaughan; 1982, 1378).
Furthermore, organizations could be criminogenic either due to
performance emphasis on goals (Gross,
• 1978; Finney and Lesieur, 1982;
Kramer, 1982) or because of defective standard operating procedures
(Hopkins, 1978).

In some corporations, illegality becomes standard

operating procedure because it is ingrained in the corporation's structure.
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In other words, organizations resort to deviant norms when legitimate
means or goals are unobtainable.
Organizations often find themselves m hostile or difficult
environments, surrounded by fierce competitors, or constrained by
regulations, which interfere with their performances.

Yet, pressures

remain from executives who seek to advance their careers by successful
operation of organizations. The stakes are very high and executives who
run the organizations will experience almost irresistible pressures to do
every thing possible to keep the organization moving toward attaining
many goals. If "every thing possible" occasionally means breaking the
law, the likelihood of doing so increases (Gross, 1978).
Organizational theorists argue that "there is built in to the very
structure of organizations an inherent inducement for the organization
itself to engage in crime" (Gross; 1978, p. 56).

This organizational

approach on corporate crime merged with a traditional criminological
theory, Merton's theory of anomie (Passas, 1990). Organizations that are
strongly goal oriented and concerned with performance might fine
legitimate means to achieve goals unavailable or blocked in some way
may induce strain and compel organizations to "innovate" and use
illegitimate means to achieve their goals. "Barriers to the attainment of
desired performance might generate such severe strain that agents resort
to illegal solutions" (Finney and Lesieur; 1982, p. 270).
The anomie's tradition that focuses on the organizational level of
analysis has been the most widely used theoretical perspective in the area
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of organizational crime (Passas, 1990). This perspective will be central to
the integrated theoretical approach present in this chapter.
In addition to performance pressure and strain, organizational
crime also seems to depend on two other factors. First, pursuing goals
through illegitimate means depends on the availability of those illegal
•
means. Organizational crime is more likely to occur when illegitimate
opportunities for achieving the organization's goals are available to
organizational actors (Braithwaite, 1989).

Second, the social control

environment also plays a role in fostering organizational crime. "Whether
or not a strong performance orientation and operating problems lead to
crime depends also on the operationally of various social controls" (Finney
and Lesieur; 1982, p. 275).
While the organizational culture defines the parameters of criminal
conduct, the organizational structure provides criminal opportunities.
Corporate crime is associated with factor such as organizational size,
diversification, autonomy, specialization, level of profitability, and growth.
Because of their great business volume, large organizations provide more
opportunities to violate the law.
diversification

isolate

High degrees of autonomy and

individual decision markers,

reducing their

visibility and magnifying problems of internal control.

Illegal acts are

easier to carry out and hide under these conditions. Loss of profits and
market share can put pressure on organizations to do something to
reverse the trend and that may turn out to be illegal.
The Structural Level Explanations: Theories of Political Economy
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The third perspective on organizational crime operates on the
structural or institutional level of analysis.

This level deals with the

larger social structure and the major social institutions of society, in
particular, political and economic institutions and the interrelationship
between them in an effort to explain organizational crime. This approach
locates the criminogenic forces in the wider political economic structure of
corporate capitalism (Barnett, 1981; Chambliss, 1988; Michalowski, 1985;
Young, 1981).
The primary assumption of this perspective is that the structure of
corporate capitalism, as an economic system, provides the major impetus
toward organizational crime. Capitalism provides the major incentives for
organizations to use illegitimate means to achieve profit or create the
conditions under which capital accumulation might take place. As laws
change, criminal opportunities also change. New laws produce a new set
of offenders as it holds corporations to different standards. Corporations
might deem old laws as irrelevant or political changes might determine
which laws regulatory agencies enforce.

This perspective extends the

Mertionian strain model by considering how the mode of material
production generates illegal activity.
Corporate crime will occur "when management chooses to pursue
corporate goals through circumvention of markets constraints in a manner
prohibited by the state" (Barnett; 1981, p. 5). A corporation will tend to
circumvent those market constraints whose violation will yield the
greatest expected net change in profit.

Therefore, one can expect that

corporation will be likely to choose to engage in crime when the expected
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costs of its illegal action are acceptably low relative to perceived gains
other things being equal.
According to Michalowski, various criminal acts that criminologists
refer to as white-collar crime can be brought together in a theoretically
informed concept of "crimes of capital" (Michalowski, 1985). Crimes of
capital are "socially injurious acts that arise from the ownership or
management of capital or from the occupancy of positions of trust m
institutions

designed

to

facilitate

(Michalowski; 1985, p. 314).

the

accumulation

of

capital"

Corporate crime, state crime, organized

crime, and occupational crime all arise from the particular forms of social
relationship associated with the process of capital accumulation,
concentration, and centralization (Michalowski, 1985).
The

organizational

perspective

and

the

political

economy

perspective have many similarities. The major unit of analysis in both is
the organization, whether corporation or the state.

Both place great

emphasis on the concept of organizational goals.

Both analyze the

problems organizations can encounter as they attempt to achieve goals
through legitimate means.

Both argue that organizations will turn to

illegal means under circumstances of strain and both note the importance
of social control mechanisms in controlling organizational crime.

The

critical difference is the way in which the political economy perspective
stresses the shaping and constraining influence of the broader historical,
institutional structure of society on organizational behavior (Kauzlarich
and Kramer, 1998).
Theories of Organizational Crime Applied to Lincoln Savings & Loan Case
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Organizational crime theorists have relied on three core concepts to
explain crimes committed by corporations and governments. These core
concepts are (1) motivation or organizational goals, (2) opportunity, and
(3) social control (Braithwaite, 1992; Coleman, 1987; Kauzlarich and
Kramer, 1998; Kramer and Michalowski, 1990, 1991; Vaughan, 1992).
This framework indicates the key factors that will contribute to or
restrain state-corporate crime at each intersection of a core concept and a
level of analysis.
The significance of these core concepts to a structural level
explanation of state-corporate crime is based on the proposition that
criminal behavior at the organizational level results from a coincidence of
pressure for goal attainment, availability and perceived attractiveness of
illegitimate means, and an absence or weakness of social control
mechanisms (Braithwaite, 1989; Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998).

This

theoretical interpretation focuses on how structural relationships affect
•
organizational practice and policy. This case study will discuss each core
concepts separately the motivation and organizational goals, opportunity,
and social control dimensions of the scandal in order to interpret the data
from this case study.
Motivation and Organizational Goals
Most crimes involve both motivation and opportunity.

All the

motivation in the world to act in a particular way means little if the
opportunity to carry out that action is not available.

Individuals and

organizations have varying kinds of goals and varying degrees of
commitment to achieving those goals. Some theorists have argued that
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the greater the emphasis on goal attainment, the more likely the resulting
behavior will be criminal. Given this assumption, one could expect that if
an individual is highly goal oriented, works in an organization that
evaluates performance strictly on goal attainment, in a society whose
cultural and institutional structures emphasize achievement above all
else, and then the chances for organizational misconduct are high
(Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998).
The Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal supports the hypothesis that
criminal or deviant behavior at the organizational level results from a
coincidence of pressure for goal attainment, availability and perceived
attractiveness of illegitimate means, and an absence of effective external
and internal social control. The external political pressure on regulators
and the internal organizational motivation of the Bank Board created a
•

•

competitive environment to compete for funds, which placed enormous
goal attainment pressure on Lincoln Savings.
••

At one point, Lincoln

Savings was unprofitable and close to insolvency. It experienced a high
degree of pressure for capital accumulation to compete in the complex
sophisticated financial market system of the 1980s. Lincoln Savings had
to pay high interest rates to keep short-term funds in its institution in
order to compete in the financial free market. Therefore, Lincoln Savings
•
employed a number of questionable investments to maximize its profit.
However, when the Bank Board received information about
American Continental's high-risk investments with Lincoln Savings'
federally insured funds, the agency did not respond according to its
organizational regulatory enforcement.

The Bank Board made the
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decision to allow Lincoln Savings to remain in American Continental's
•
control.
The other organization involved in the scandal was the Bank
Board. The Bank Board was not directly a profit-seeking entity, but its
_;

..

a
.- of capital
function was to regulate and facilitate the accumulation
for

Lincoln Savings. The Bank Board's refusal to ·enforce specific laws and
regulations that could have prevented the debacle of Lincoln Savings
• result not only from
demonstrates the injurious consequences that can

pursuing

profit,

but also from state encouragement of capital

accumulation.
A major goal of the United States has been to promote capital
accumulation; and the state's regulatory function must then achieve two
contradictory goals.

First, it "must severe enough to maintain the

legitimacy of the state." Second, it "must not be so severe as to diminish
substantially the contribution of large corporations to growth in output

.

and employment" (Barnett, 1981; Chambliss and Zatz, 1993).

.
Likewise, the government would not expect the Bank
Board to

compromise the contribution that Lincoln Savings made to local
community and national economies. However, the difference between the
Bank Board and other regulatory agencies was its dual function of
regulating Lincoln Savings and promoting its economic success.

The

pursuit of profit was critical in the formulation of the Bank Board's
organizational policy and practice. Thus, the actors, actions, omissions
and social circumstance that surrounded Lincoln Savings' high-risk
investments from the Garn-St. Germain Act, supervision, intervention,
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state and federal agencies, and the organizations of both the S&L
industry and the U.S. political economy caused the Lincoln & Savings

Loan Scandal.
Opportunity Structure
The second core concept directs attentions to the opportunity
structure of means that organizations and their agents might use to
achieve organizational goals. A proposition of organizational crime theory
is that low levels of external social control provide opportunities for
organizations to engage in crime.

Not only a competitive environment

shapes organizational behavior, but also "the regulatory environment,
which is affected by the relationship between regulators and the
organizations they regulated" (Vaughan, 1996, p. 458).
Economic deregulation and the contradictory role of the Bank
Board as regulator and promoter of the S&L industry provided the larger
background for Lincoln Savings' organizational genesis and persistence.
This case study described the deficiencies and contradictions in the
structural control of the S&L industry brought about by deregulation.
This is related to the Bank Board's organizational disregard for the
blatant violation of Lincoln Savings' fraudulent investments and
practices. Instead of the Bank Board aggressively enforcing that Lincoln
Savings make its investments in compliance with federal regulations, the
Bank Board held Lincoln Savings as the "Jackpot" of economic
deregulation (Waldman and Thomas; 1990, p. 27).
Given the authority and resources of the Bank Board, Lincoln
Savings encountered both a favorable opportunity structure and a great
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deal of freedom from the Bank Board as it pursued its structural goals.
With all the legitimate opportunities available, why then did Lincoln
Savings use the illegitimate means described as crimes? As noted earlier,

..
many organizations turn to illegal means to achieve organizational
goals
when legal means are blocked in some form. Lincoln Savings was not able
to achieve its investments with federally insured funds because of the
equity-rule. Therefore, Lincoln Savings found illegal ways to purse its
goal.
On the structural level, it is clear that opportunities to commit
fraud were readily available because of the Garn-St. Germain
• Act, the
Nolan Act of 1983, the Keating Five, and how the Bank Board shielded
Lincoln Savings from public scrutiny. Sufficient regulations were always
in place for the investments of federally insured funds.

However, the

Bank Board held principal power and discretion over the FHLB-SF

..

regulators' enforcement actions against Lincoln Savings.
On an organizational level of analysis, American Continental and

.

Lincoln Savings were free to use the most effective methods to pursue

-

their goals. However, the most effective" means available threaten
• the
S&L industry by selling uninsured junk bonds, land swapping, loan
swapping, and fraudulent investments, which were illegal.

Keating

.,. ..
appeared to have had the opportunity as his organizations pursued the

most effective means to complete American Continental and Lincoln
Savings' role requirements. They were limited only by their questionable
behavior from important control audiences.
Social Control

..

- forces
The third core concept is of social control mechanisms. Social
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exist at all three levels of analysis, exerting pressure on organizations and
organizational actors and checking their efforts to select illegal means to
goal attainment.

..

~·

,r
At the structural level,
criminal justice or other

governmental regulatory bodies could impose various forms of legal

..........
Public opinion could pressure· offending organizations.

sanctions.

..

Scrutiny from the mass media, social movement organizations, or citizen
watchdog

groups

could

exert

y
social-control

..
influence.

At

the

organizational level, internal cultures of compliance might regulate the

... ... strong
behavior of organizational actors. Finally, at the individual level,
ethical standards might be an important defense against involvement in
opportunities for organizational crime.

..
However,
on the structural level, there was a lack of social control

at Lincoln Savings. The Bank Board did not closely monitor social control
at the organizational and institutional level of analysis.
Lincoln Savings
•
achieved its organizational goals without fear
• of publicity or legal
challenges. The Bank Board's failure to enforce its "equity rule" for direct
investments facilitated the fraudulent use of federally insured funds and
I
the fraudulent sale of worthless junk bonds to 23,000 investors. Had the

·._
Bank Board enforced the laws and regulations at Lincoln Savings, the

institution might have operated in a different manner.
.,..
Furthermore, there was a failure of social control because of the

contradictory role of the Bank Board. The controversy that emerged in
the wake of the scandal was the mismanagement of the Bank Board under
Danny Wall.

Serious deficiencies existed in the way the Bank Board
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responded to Lincoln Savings' criminal activities. Besides, the network of
political influence, the structural flaw that sabotaged the Federal Home
;.
Loan Banking System consisted of conflicting responsibilities between the

Bank Board and the San Francisco regulators.

The Bank Board's

responsibilities were to promote the welfare of the savings and loan
industry, yet at the same time was the industry's regulator.
The FHLB-SF regulators had the responsibility for supervision and
enforcement at Lincoln Savings, but had no legal authority to seize or
close Lincoln Savings. The agency had to receive approval from the Bank
Board before it could take any action against Lincoln Savings.

This

conflict allowed American Continental Corporation to remain in control of
federally

insured

funds

and continued its fraudulent activities.

Furthermore, Wall transferred Lincoln Savings' oversight to a different
jurisdiction to avoid closing the thrift. This unprecedented move set a
new standard in the regulatory enforcement, and undermined the
integrity and the perception of the supervisory process. Therefore, this
contradictory role of government failed at the social control level.
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CONCLUSION

.. was a
In the Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal, what emerged
conservative small-town thrift that played a major role in the high-finance
. .
.. .
world of economic deregulation, which produced a ''crimmogemc
environment" (Needleman and Needleman; 1979, p. 517). As this study
revealed, Congress and the Bank Board intended to provide affordable
housing in the country's financial system.

Their overall goal was to

prevent abuse and the perceived weakness of the financial system that led
to the "Banking Holiday." However, economic deregulation combined with
generous deposit insurance and the political intervention set the stage for
the explosive growth at Lincoln Savings as well as the epidemic of
financial fraud that accompanied Lincoln's growth in three ways.
First, economic deregulation exacerbated the Lincoln Savings' crisis

.. .
and allowed it to become the most costly financial scandal in American
history.

American Continental saw a window of opportunity to

restructure Lincoln Savings by its addiction to high-risk investments that
had the potential to maximize profit at American Continental. Second,
the evidence suggests that behind the policy shifts of the early 1980s,
were members of Congress who selectively pushed for deregulation. The
deposit insurance revealed the inadequacy of ideological motives for the
policy shifts. The backroom decision surrounding these policy shifts had
well documented connections between members of Congress and American
Continental. This would suggest that private financial interest was at
least as important as the ideology of economic deregulation.

Finally,

economic deregulation was the product of political decisions made by
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individuals with political and financial incentives. The "Keating Five"
political intervention in shielding Lincoln Savings from regulatory
scrutiny delayed the necessary supervisory action against Lincoln
Savings.

Their considerations favored Lincoln Savings and American

Continental, but cost 23,000 investors and American taxpayers billions of
dollars.
This case study indicates that many components of the system
designed to protect the Lincoln Savings, from the Bank Board to the
FHLB-SF regulators, had failed in order for the scandal to occur. The
scandal is clear evidence that laws and regulations alone are not sufficient
to prevent corporate fraud. They require political will for their effective

.
enforcement. The scandal constitutes
a clear instance of state-corporate
crime because it was the absence of political will and omissions on the
part of Bank Board that enabled the American Continental Corporation to
continue violating federal laws and regulations at Lincoln Savings in its
pursuit of private profits.
As with many cases in the Lincoln Savings imbroglio, there will
probably never be definitive answers to all the questions concerning the
criminal activities at Lincoln Savings, or the specific role-played by
various actors.

However, even though federal and state authorities

eventually punished Keating for his role in the scandal, state-facilitated
state-corporate crime allowed the ability to understand how the Lincoln
Savings and Loan Scandal occurred.

State crime is one of the most important and complicated types of
crime to study. State crime is important because it reminds us that the
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creator and enforcer of law can also be a criminal agent. Such crime may
inflict a far greater amount of social injury than that caused by traditional
street crime. The study of state crime is complicated because actors are
generally powerful and privileged, and the authority of the state formally
supports this power and privilege (Barak, 1993).
Many forms of state crime might be u·nrecognizable from what
many might consider normative state policy.

Legal responses to state

crime are everr less authoritative and problematic than the reaction to
corporate crime.

Reconstructing the events of a state crime can be

difficult because the state has the power to conceal and classify documents
that implicate wrongdoing.

For example, Author Andersen Accounting

firm shredding documents in the Enron Corporation scandal. Given these
complexities and accompanying political and disciplinary problems, one
should expect that the development of a solid criminology of state would
be an arduous task (Barak, 1993; Tunnell, 1993).
This case study attempted to apply the most central theoretical
concepts in the organizational crime literature to help explain the Lincoln
Savings & Loan Scandal. The circumstances surrounding the scandal are

complex, and a comprehensive theoretical explanation would be equally
complicated.

However, extant organizational crime theory renders the

Lincoln Savings & Loan Scandal intelligible, although the extent to which

these theories are generalize to other instances of state-corporate crime
(state-initiated or state facilitated) must be addressed in future research.
In short, the research in this case study supports the multi
dimensional theoretical proposition that coincidence of a very strong level
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of motivation for the accumulation of capital by corporations and a severe
lack of external control by governmental agency results in conditions
conducive to harmful organizational practices in identifiable ways. State
corporate crimes result from an interaction of individual, motivation to
commit crime, opportunity, and lack of social control. Further research
can pinpoint how decision makers respond to pressures and how strains
within and outside the organizations produce state-corporate crime.
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